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Abstract
In April 2003, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (”SARS”) disease spread to the island of
Taiwan. These statements, made by the general who assigned the R.O.C. government to assume
the task of the post-surrender administration of Formosa, and those of the high governmental
officials of the leading Allied Powers not only demonstrate that the R.O.C. government has not
acquired title to the island of Taiwan by occupation for the State of China, but also attest to the
existence of a rule in international law that if title to a territory of the defeated State is to be changed
after a war, then it must be achieved by a territorial treaty. ... Because the modern State is based on
territory, China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan is necessarily predicated on its claim of title to
the island of Taiwan. As analyzed herein, China never reacquired title to the island of Taiwan by
any recognized means in international law: it did not acquire it under the Cairo Declaration; it did
not acquire it by the Peace Treaty of San Francisco or any other treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2003, the severe acute respiratory syndrome
("SARS") disease spread to the island of Taiwan.1 Not being a
member of the World Health Organization ("WHO"), Taiwan
could not receive information provided by the WHO for
preventing the spread of the SARS diseases. Earlier, the govern-
ment of the Republic of China ("R.O.C.") in Taiwan applied to
the WHO to become an observer at its annual meeting, the
World Health Assembly ("WHA"), as it had done repeatedly in
the past several years. On May 12, 2003, when the WHA opened
its session in Geneva, the Assembly again rejected the R.O.C.'s
application. The U.N. Press Club decided to hold a press confer-
ence2 at the U.N. headquarters in New York City to discuss the
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1. The geographical term "Taiwan" in its strict sense refers to the island of For-
mosa, and in its broad sense, to a group of islands consisting of Formosa and a few
surrounding islands, including the Pescadores (Penghu), Green Island (previously
called Kashoto by the Japanese), and Lan (Orchid) Islet, but does not include Quemoy
(Kinmen) or Matsu, two small islands off the Chinese coast. The word "Taiwan" in the
political term "Republic of China in Taiwan" is used in its broad sense.
As used in this Article, the terms "Formosa" and "island of Taiwan" both refer to
Taiwan in its broad sense, and the term "Taiwan" refers to the political entity existing
on the island of Taiwan with a government called "the Republic of China." Hence, the
term "Republic of China" ("R.O.C.") refers to the government of the political entity
Taiwan.
2. The press conference took place on May 23, 2003. See U.N. Bars Taiwanese Offi-
cial From Briefing, WASH. POST, May 24, 2003, at A22.
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WHO's rejection of Taiwan in its efforts to gain entry into the
organization. The Press Club invited an official from the Taipei
Cultural and Economic Office, an informal consulate office of
the R.O.C. government, to speak at the conference. When the
R.O.C. official attempted to enter the U.N. building, Kofi An-
nan, the U.N. Secretary-General, barred him from entry "be-
cause of the organization's 'one-China' policy."'
It was not the first time that Kofi Annan, as the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, had expressed his view regarding
Taiwan. When a strong earthquake struck the central island of
Taiwan in 1999, while people lay buried under the rubble, An-
nan said that the United Nations had to wait for the approval of
the People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.") before sending a dis-
aster assessment team to what he called "the Taiwan Province of
China."4 Likewise, the WI-O's website referred to Taiwan as the
"Taiwan province, China."5
Kofi Annan's statements referring to the United Nation's
"one-China policy" and the "Taiwan Province of China" reflect
his view on Taiwan. His view calls into question the sovereignty
over the island of Taiwan and its inhabitants. This Article will
first review international law related to territories and then ex-
amine whether China has, by any recognized means in interna-
tional law, acquired sovereignty over Taiwan. It will then review
the U.S. government's position on title to the island of Taiwan
and will examine Kofi Annan's statements to see if they re-
present the position of the United Nations. Finally, the Article
will suggest a solution to the Taiwan problem.
I. TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Modern State
The modern State is a product of Western civilization and
3. Id.
4. See UN Sends Coordinating Rescue Team to Taiwan, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 22,
1999; Corky Siemaszko, Taiwan Digging Out, Frantic Rescuers Hunt for Quake Survivors,
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 1999, at 7.
5. See World Health Organization Changes Travel Recommendation for Taiwan Province,
China, June 17, 2003 (changing a previous advisory that recommended postponing all
but essential travel t- Taiwan, in order to contain a spread of severe acute respiratory
syndrome ("SARS")), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/; see also U.N.
DAILY NEWS DIGEST, WHO Urges Precautions in Labs After Worker in Taiwan, China, Gets
SARS, Dec. 17, 2003 (using the expression "Taiwan, Province of China"), available at
http://www.un.org/news/.
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was created in Western Europe.' It evolved gradually from the
medieval feudal States during the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries.
7
The modern State possesses two major characteristics.'
First, unlike its medieval predecessor, it is based on territory. In
the European feudal system, the king ruled his kingdom by con-
tract through his feudal vassals and did not directly rule the com-
mon people. The State was built on the king's control of his
vassals rather than on territory. The king collected taxes from
his vassals, who in turn collected taxes from the people under
their rule. Hence, for the king, the outer limit of his domain was
not important.'
Because the modern State rules its people directly, and col-
lects their taxes from its subjects and often also on the lands, it
has to define the territory in which they reside. The definition
of the State's territory now includes boundaries and a frontier.
This frontier creates a "hard shell" for the protection of the peo-
ple within the territory.'" The State has the power and authority
to govern not only its nationals but also aliens within its bounda-
ries. On the other hand, the boundaries also create a limitation
of the State's authority. It has no power or authority beyond its
territory.' The term "territorial State" or "territoriality,"12 as
used in this Article, refers to the notion of the modern territory-
based State.
Further, the modern State is a sovereign State.13 A sover-
eign State has two characteristics. Internally, it rules the subjects
6. See HEINZ LUBASZ, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 1 (1964).
7. For a discussion on the development of the modern State, see Y. Frank Chiang,
State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 959, 962-63 (2000).
8. Other writers point out other characteristics of the modern State, such as the
fact that it is governed by a system of law and that it recognizes a distinction between
the State and society. See LUBASZ, supra note 6, at 2-3. These points are not discussed
here because they are not relevant to this Article.
9. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 17 (1990).
10. SeeJohn H. Herz, The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, in 9 WORLD POLITICS
473-74 (1957).
11. The territory of a State also includes its territorial sea as recognized by interna-
tional law. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 2,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397; see also REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-38 (4th
ed. 2002).
12. For a discussion of the term "territoriality," see Herz, supra note 10, at 475-85.
13. For a discussion of the sovereign State, see Chiang, supra note 7, at 964-66.
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or the peoples within its territory directly through its govern-
ment. Externally, the State is autonomous and therefore not
subject to other States or authorities.14
Sovereignty and the modern State are inseparable con-
cepts. 15 State autonomy, inherent in sovereignty, gives rise to
the concept of equality among the States. That is, two States can
engage in relations, e.g., diplomatic exchanges or concluding
treaties, on equal footing. However, the concept of equality be-
tween States existed long before the formulation of the modern
concept of sovereignty.
In the early days, the leaders of two or more groups of peo-
ple who had the same interests entered into military alliance
agreements against others groups. These leaders also divided
territories by agreements.' 6 The agreements between the rulers
of the kingdoms were called treaties. When two kings entered
into an agreement or a treaty, the two were equal in their legal
status.
After the end of the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth
century, 17 the princes of the Holy Roman Empire sought from
the empire the capacity, to enter into relations with others. They
needed such capacity to enter into alliance treaties with other
princes. In the Treaty of Westphalia, the Roman Emperor
granted them the right and capacity to conclude such treaties. 8
14. See LUBASZ, supra note 6, at 2.
15. See Chiang, supra note 7, at 962-65 (discussing the relationship between State
and sovereignty).
16. See 12 NEW ENCYCLOP2eDtA BRITANNICA 316 (15th ed. 1994). When Emperor
Charlemagne's son, Louis I,*died in 840, Louis I's three sons, Charles, Lothair, and
Louis, fought over the vast territory. See id. The war among the three brothers ended
with the Treaty of Verdun in 843. See id. The treaty divided the empire into four parts.
See id. The West Frankish Kingdom (Francia Occidentalis), consisting mostly of what is
today France, went to Charles (later Charles I), who was considered the first true king
of France. See id. The Middle Kingdom, consisting of the Low Countries, Alsace, Bur-
gundy, northern Italy, Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Provence, went to Lothair (later
Lothair I). See id. The Kingdom of East Franks (Francia Orientalis), consisting of the
land east of the Rhein River and mostly of what is today Germany, went to Louis (later
Louis the German). See id. The fourth part, consisting of the eastern tributary prov-
inces, did not come under the direct rule of any brother. See id.
17. The conflict between Protestants and Catholics and between Lutherans and
Calvinists led to the Thirty Years War. See 19 NEW ENCYCLOPeDIA BRITANNICA 482-83
(15th ed. 1994). In 1648, the Catholic Emperor Ferdinand III, defeated by Protestant
forces, signed the Peace of Westphalia, which consisted of a series of treaties. See id.
18. In the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Holy Roman Emperor formally
granted the German princes the right to make alliances. The Holy Roman Empire
became a meaningless entity. Germany was left with more than 260 sovereign States
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Historians regard the granting of such capacity as conferring sov-
ereign independence upon the princes of the Holy Roman Em-
pire within the feudal structure of the empire. 9 After the con-
cept of the State changed from the ruler to the political entity,
2 °
treaties were then between two political entities, instead of be-
tween rulers. Only political entities with statehood may con-
clude a treaty with another political entity with statehood.
21
Because each State is autonomous, a State is not subject to
the rules imposed by other States. Each State therefore, in the-
ory, has unlimited power. Such power, if not restrained, may
encroach on the rights or interests of other States. Accordingly,
international law emerged by consensus of the States to restrain
or limit their own power.2 2 Thus, international law is created for
self-limitation and self-regulation and the basis of international
law is consent.23
The level of equality inherent in the concept of sovereignty
is meaningful only when a State deals with other States. Equal
status with other States means that a State can enter into rela-
tions with other States on equal footing. Thus, the capacity to
enter into relations with other States on equal footing becomes
part of the concept of sovereignty and one of the features of the
modern State. Diplomatic recognition of a State means that the
recognizing State will deal with the recognized State on equal
footing. Thus, the power of a State based on sovereignty is two-
fold: the power to rule or govern the people and the land within
its territory, and the power and capacity to enter into relations
with other States, including concluding treaties with other
States.
and principalities headed by princes without an effective central government. See Treaty
of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, Holy Roman Emperor-King of France, at http://fletcher.
tufts.edu/multi/texts/historical/westphalia.txt [hereinafter Treaty of Westphalia); see
also 19 NEW ENCYCLOPaeDA BRITANNICA 482 (15th ed. 1994).
19. The Emperor himself lost sovereignty. See Herz, supra note 10, at 479.
20. See Chiang, supra note 7, at 961-63 (discussing the transformation of the State
from a ruler to a political entity).
21. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2.1 (a), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
22. See HANNUM, supra note 9, at 19; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1206 (1988).
23. See HANNUM supra note 9, at 19.
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B. Sovereignty, Territoriality, and International Law
There are three principal sources of international law: (1)
treaties, including international conventions; (2) international
custom; and (3) the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations. 24 These sources are all based on the consensus of
the States, albeit in different ways. Treaties and international
conventions are the most explicit demonstration of consensus.
They are signed by the contracting States. International custom
arose out of the consensus of the States on State practices, or
based on the writings of ancient writers. In his work, The Law of
War and Peace, Hugo Grotius proved a posteriori that a body of
international law is created by the common consent of the
States.25
The general principles of law recognized by civilized Na-
tions also form a basis for the creation of international law where
there is no international convention or custom. When a rule of
international law is based on the general legal principles recog-
nized by civilized Nations, the rule is also based on the consent
of civilized Nations - the States. Samuel Pufendorf, in his book
The Law of Nature and Nations," used the method a priori to de-
duce logically from the rational and social nature of man, "cer-
tain universal legal principles" which were accepted by different
societies and "binding . .. on all men." Such principles "could
then be regarded as the basis of an international law."'27
The concept of sovereignty and the principle of territoriality
are accepted by all States and form the following four basic prin-
ciples of international law:
(1) A State has sovereign power over its territory and the peo-
ple within its territory.28 The power of a State, however,
ceases at its border. To avoid conflicts arising out of the
concept of unrestrained sovereignty, the States limited
the exercise of their sovereignty to territory within their
24. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179; see also WALLACE, supra note 11, at 7-33.
25. See PETER STEIN, LEcAL EVOLUTION, THE STORY OF AN IDEA 3 (1980) (discussing
de iure belli ac pacis).
26. See id. (discussing de iure naturae et gentium).
27. Id. at 3, 51.
28. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 452 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955) ("The importance of State territory lies in the fact that it is the space
within which the State exercises its supreme authority.").
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borders by consensus. Thus, exercising the police power
in another State without the consent of the latter en-
croaches on the sovereignty of the other State.29
(2) A State has the capacity to conclude treaties and is bound
by them. Each State is a sovereign and may enter into a
relation, e.g., conclude a treaty, with another State on
equal footing. Equal footing does not mean equal bar-
gaining power. This is particularly true in a peace treaty
concluding a war. The State is bound by the treaty which
it has concluded with another State even though at the
time of concluding the treaty, it was in a weaker bargain-
ing position.
(3) After a war, the victorious State may dispose of the terri-
tories of the defeated State. As stated before, the mod-
ern State is based on territory, which becomes one of the
elements of a State.3 0 A conflict between States often
leads to a war. After the war, the victorious State may
take the territory of the defeated State, which has limited
or no bargaining power.3 '
The victorious State may annex the defeated State,
although such instances are rare in modern times. In
such a case, no treaty is needed or possible for taking the
territory because the defeated State is extinct and the vic-
torious State has no party with which to conclude a
treaty. In most cases, the victorious State merely wants to
take from the defeated State a piece of its territory. From
the defeated State's point of view, ceding part of its terri-
tory to the victorious State is the price to pay in order to
preserve the State.
(4) Unless the victorious State annexes the defeated State by
29. See Barbara Crossette, The Summit in New York: The Overview; Leaders Debate
Broad New Role For U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at Al. In recent years, an
exception based on the new concept of human rights has evolved. See id. Under the
new concept, if a State oppresses the people within its territory, another State may inter-
vene in order to protect them. See id.; see also Richard Reeves, United Nations: A Tale of
Two Speeches, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 24, 1999. For instance, the Allied Powers attacked
Serbia's army in Kosovo in 1999. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 263.
30. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,
art. 1., 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 U.N.T.S. 21; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (3d ed. 1987).
31. See, e.g.,John Foster Dulles, The San Francisco Conference on Proposed Japa-
nese Peace Treaty, Statement to the Press (Aug. 15, 1951), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug.
1951, at 347. At the Conference, John Foster Dulles, representing the United States,
stated that "[t]he United States, which for [six] years has been and is the occupying
power [in Japan], could practically do much as it wanted." Id.
2004]
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State practice, particularly after the modern State is fully
developed,3 2 taking or ceding a territory is accomplished
by treaties. This is true even if a victorious State wants to
acquire an enemy's territory which it occupied during
the war. In 1828, Chief Justice Marshall in American In-
surance Co. v. Cantor3 said that " It] he usage of the world
is, if a [N] ation be not entirely subdued, to consider the
holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupa-
tion, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of
peace."3 4 The State practice has developed into a cus-
tomary international law requiring that if tide to a terri-
tory of the defeated State is to be changed after a war,
then it must be achieved by a treaty. 35
C. Territorial Treaties
A treaty may be of cultural, economic, military (i.e., defense
alliances), political, or scientific in nature. There is also a type
of treaty that changes the territories of the parties, e.g., delineat-
ing the territorial boundary, transferring the title to a territory,
dividing, or abandoning a territory, which will be referred to as
territorial treaties in this Article. Historically, major wars have
ended through concluding peace treaties between the warring
States.36 Most peace treaties are also territorial treaties that real-
locate territories of the parties.
32. King Louis II of East Kingdom (later the Holy Roman Empire) acquired Alsace
by the Treaty of Mersen in 870. France acquired Alsace in the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697
and Lorraine by marriage in 1766. Germany reacquired Alsace and Lorraine by the
Treaty of Versailles in 1871. After the First World War, France again acquired Alsace
and Lorraine under the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Acquisition of a territory by mar-
riage is analogous to acquisition by a merger agreement. Other examples include: the
Treaty of Paris (1898), concluded at the end of the Spanish-American War, in which
Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States; the Treaty of Nanking (1842), concluded
at the end of the Opium War, in which China ceded Hong Kong to the United King-
dom; and the Congress of Vienna (1815), concluded at the end of the Napoleon War,
which settled the territories among the European States. See CoLUM. ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th
ed. 2001), available at www.bartleby.com/65 (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
33. 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
34. See id. at 541.
35. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, § 216; see also GEORGE H. KERR, FORMOSA BE-
TRAYED, 39 (1965) ("[S]overeignty could not be transferred until a peace treaty could
be worked out, agreed upon, and signed."); Hague Convention Respecting The Laws
and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
§ III, art. 55.
36. See, e.g., Treaty of Verdun (843); Treaty of Westphalia, supra note 18; Treaty of
Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]; Treaty of
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Territorial treaties have peculiar characteristics. By their
nature, they are different from other types of treaties in many
ways. First, territorial treaties are proprietary as well as contrac-
tual in nature, while other types of treaties are purely contrac-
tual. Such territorial treaties, like deeds in property law, involve
a transfer of interest in land and affect the sovereign power of
the parties to the treaties. Second, territorial treaties provide a
final settlement of the territories between the parties. It has the
characteristics of finality. Other types of treaties are forward
looking. For instance, they may provide for cooperation in the
future, or establish new rules of conduct between the con-
tracting parties. Third, territorial treaties are self-executing.
Unless otherwise agreed, they take effect immediately when they
enter into force. Other types of treaties are usually executory,
meaning that they provide promises to be carried out in the fu-
ture. As discussed below, these characteristics form the bases of
several aspects of territorial treaties.
A territorial treaty, in which a State cedes a territory to an-
other State or renounces its title to a territory, provides a final
settlement of the territory. Once the territorial treaty enters into
force, the treaty's disposition of the territory becomes effective.
A treaty of executory nature may be denounced by a party subse-
quent to the conclusion, 7 but a territorial treaty cannot be abro-
gated or revoked by one party alone, 38 no matter how unfair it
seems.
The only way for the ceding State to regain the title to the
ceded territory from the acquiring State is through another
treaty. This rule is derived from the State practice and the char-
Versailles (1919); Treaty of Peace With Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 (entered
into force Apr. 28, 1952) [hereinafter Peace Treaty of San Francisco].
37. For instance, in 1939, afterJapan blockaded British and French concessions in
Tientsin City, China, the United States denounced its treaty of commerce with Japan.
See Brad DeLong, Review of Akira Iriye's The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and in
the Pacific, available at http://www.j-bradford-delong.net (last visited Oct. 4, 2004); see
also Ibiblio, A Chronological Collection of Documents Relating to the U.S. Entry Into WWlI,
available at http://www.ibi8blio.org/pha/timeline/144chap4.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2004).
38. Except, probably, on the ground of fraud in the execution or direct duress on
the representatives who signed the treaty. Both are rare instances. See, e.g., David
Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 634 (1995)
(providing an example of possible grounds for condemnation of a treaty because of
coercion).
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acteristics of a territorial treaty discussed earlier.39 For example,
Alsace and Loraine have changed hands between Germany and
France several times. Each time, this exchange was achieved by a
treaty."
In a territorial treaty, only a party to the treaty can receive
the title to a territory. No State which is not a party to the treaty
can receive title to a territory disposed of by the treaty. This rule
is derived from the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized Nations a priori. Under the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized Nations, when title to a piece of land is con-
veyed by the grantor in the deed, only a party to a deed can
receive it.
Territorial treaties use precise and unambiguous words and
language, such as "cede," "divide," "relinquish," or "renounce"
to dispose of a territory. Since territorial treaties stipulate the
final settlement between the parties, or the final disposition of
territories, and they leave no room for doubt or dispute. In rare
cases where there is a dispute on the meaning of a term or
terms, the ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty and the
intention of the parties control. This approach is the general
rule of interpreting treaties,'" which was recognized and
adopted by the 1969 Vienna Convention.4 2
Territorial treaties bind States which are not parties to the
treaties. Under customary international law, it is a general rule
that only the parties to a treaty are bound by the treaty. A third
party is not bound by the treaty because it has not consented to
the treaty.43 But, there are exceptions to this general rule.4 4 Ex-
ceptions to the general rule are recognized by the Vienna Con-
vention of 1969. Article 38 of the Vienna Convention provides
that "[n] othing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a
treaty from becoming binding upon a third [S] tate as a custom-
39. See supra notes 25, 36-37 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 32.
41. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 240.
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 2.1(a). The Convention essentially
codified customary international law. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 230. Article 31 of
the Convention provides interpretive methodologies for all treaties. See id. at 240; see
also Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31.
43. See MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-11 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing the principle of pacta sunt servanda).
44. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 241-42 (discussing the principle of pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt).
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ary rule of international law, recognized as such."4 5 One excep-
tion applies to territorial treaties.46 The exception is that territo-
rial treaties produce obligations which third parties must re-
spect.47 This exception is one of customary international law
that has developed from long-held State practices that territorial
treaties are rarely challenged by a third party. These principles
and rules of international law will be the basis of the analysis that
follows.
II. TITLE TO THE ISLAND OF TAIWAN
Discussion now turns to the question raised in the Introduc-
tion - whether China has sovereignty over the island of Taiwan
and its inhabitants. As stated before, the modern State is contin-
gent upon the concept of territory. A State has no sovereignty
over a territory unless it has legal title to that territory. The his-
torical events that changed or are claimed to have changed the
title to the island of Taiwan will be examined below.
A. The Treaty of Shimonoseki
In 1894,Japan and China engaged in the Sino-Japanese War
in which Japan defeated China. As a result, in 1895 the Ch'ing
government of China signed a peace treaty known as the Treaty
of Shimonoseki with Japan.48 In this Treaty, China ceded the
islands of Formosa and the Pescadores Group (together called
Formosa or the island of Taiwan) "in perpetuity to Japan. ' 49 At
first, Japan distinguished Formosa as a colony, but later incorpo-
rated the island as its territory proper.5' As mentioned before, a
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 38.
46. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 242.
47. See id.
48. Treaty of Peace, Apr. 17, 1895, China-Japan, 181 Consol. T.S. 217 [hereinafter
Treaty of Shimonoseki].
49. Id. art. 2. Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki provides:
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territo-
ries, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon ....
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging
to the said island of Formosa. (c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all
islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Green-
wich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Id.
50. For instance, the Japanese government required all residents in Taiwan to
adopt a Japanese surname in the 1940s. See Brian Lee Brubaker, Language Attitudes
and Identity in Taiwan 18 (2003) (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh) available at
2004]
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peace treaty that transfers a territory to conclude a war is usual
and binding.5" The victorious State acquires good title to the
territory ceded under the treaty.
B. Proclamations of the R. 0. C. Government
In September 1931, Japan began its expansion in Asia and
sent its troops into northern China.52 By 1939, the Japanese
armed forces had occupied a vast area of central and eastern
China. In December 1941, the R.O.C. government declared war
against Japan, and at the same time issued a proclamation abro-
gating all treaties with Japan, including the Treaty of Shimono-
seki on the ground that the Treaty was "unequal."53
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, however, is a territorial treaty.
A unilateral proclamation to abrogate a treaty by a party to the
treaty may be valid with respect to a treaty of executory nature,
but it cannot effectively abrogate a territorial treaty. This is true
even though the defeated State regards the treaty as unequal. A
treaty in which a defeated State is forced to cede a territory is
necessarily unequal because the defeated State is not in an equal
bargaining position with the victorious State. The defeated State
cedes the territory to end the war and save the State. The term
"unequal treaty" is a political concept rather than a legal term
recognized in international law.54 No such treaty has ever been
effectively abrogated or revoked on the ground of inequality in
history. It follows that the proclamation of the Chinese govern-
ment abrogating all treaties with Japan was ineffective with re-
spect to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
Furthermore, a territorial treaty cannot be abrogated or re-
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-08192003-082704/unrestricted/Bruba-
kerthesis.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) (discussing pressure placed on Taiwanese to
assume Japanese surnames).
51. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
52. See EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN, PAST AND PRESENT 170 (3d ed. 1964).
53. See THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, WHITE PAPER - THE ONE-CHINA PRINCI-
PLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE (2002), available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.
htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) [hereinafter 2000 White Paper].
54. For a discussion of unequal treaties, see GARY L. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES:
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 85-99
(1975). "[N]one of these writers[, Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Wolf,] considered
that inequality in treaties was in any way a cause for abrogation or a factor invalidating
treaties." Id. at 86. See generally PETER WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997:
CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES (1998); FARiBORZ NOZARI,
UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
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voked on the ground of a subsequent aggression of the other
party to the treaty. In 1955, during the period of parliamentary
debates On the sovereignty over Formosa in the British House of
Commons, legal scholar Georg Schwarzenberger commented on
the cession of Formosa by China to Japan in the Peace Treaty of
Shimonoseki:
China had ceded Formosa to Japan by the peace treaty of
Shimonoseki of April 16, 1895. In order to judge the validity
of this cession subsequent developments in international law
which may, or may not, have affected the validity of cessions
achieved as the result of aggressive war must be disregarded.
Thus, the validity of this cession can hardly be contested.55
Neither the R.O.C. government, which issued the proclamation,
nor the competing P.R.C. government can claim, on behalf of
China, title to the island of Taiwan based on this proclamation.
In 1945, immediately after Japan surrendered to the Allied
Powers, the R.O.C. government sitting in Chungking City, pro-
claimed that Taiwan was a province of China. As stated before, a
victorious State in a war cannot acquire a territory of the de-
feated State by unilateral proclamation.56 Accordingly, R. H.
Turton, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
Churchill's administration said, "[u] nilateral declarations could
not affect the legal status of Formosa," referring to China's proc-
lamation.5 7
C. Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation
In 1941, Japan declared war against the United States,
which then leading the Allied Powers, engaged Japan in the Pa-
cific War.58 In 1943, while the Pacific War was in progress, U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churc-
55. Georg Schwarzenberger, Letter to the Editor, Formosa And China, Examination
of Legal Status, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 2, 1955. Schwarzenberger was a Reader in Inter-
national Law at the University College of London. See id.
56. According to George Kerr, the Japanese did not consider China a victorious
State. See KERR, supra note 35, at 61 ("[Japanese Military High Command] considered
thatJapan had not surrendered to 'China' but to 'Chungking,' where the Chinese and
the Americans had their military headquarters.") (emphasis added).
57. See 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) (1955) 216.
58. General MacArthur recalled that "none of these powers [Russia and the
United Kingdom] had been forthcoming with troops to fight the Pacific war when we
[the United States] needed them. We had borne the burden with Australia .. " DouG-
LAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 291 (1964).
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hill of the United Kingdom, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
of China met in Cairo from November 22 to 26, 1943 to discuss
the strategy for defeating Japan.59 On December 1, 1943, the
three governments issued a joint statement known as the Cairo
Declaration.6 ° The Cairo Declaration states, in part,
The Three Great Allies ... covet no gain for themselves and
have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose
... that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be re-
stored to the Republic of China. . . . The aforesaid three
great powers . . .are determined that in due course Korea
shall become free and independent.61
In 1945, after Germany surrendered, U.S. President Harry
Truman,62 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,63 and the
Soviet PremierJoseph Stalin 64 conferred in Potsdam on the post-
war disposition of Europe from July 17 to August 12. During the
conference on July 26, the heads of governments of China, the
United Kingdom, and the United States issued the Proclamation
Defining Terms For Japanese Surrender, which as part of the
Potsdam Declaration confirmed the Cairo Declaration with re-
spect to the future of Formosa.65 The Potsdam Proclamation
states that "[t] he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried
out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as
59. The U.S.S.R. (The Soviet Union), not at war with Japan then, was not repre-
sented at the Cairo Conference. See Cairo Declaration, in NEW CYCLE IN ASIA 29 (Harold
R. Isaacs ed., 1947). Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek became the President of the Re-
public of China on September 13, 1943.
60. See Cairo Declaration, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1943, at 393 [hereinafter Cairo
Declaration].
61. Id.
62. Harry S. Truman, the U.S. President (1945-1953).
63. Winston S. Churchill, the British Prime Minister (1940-1945); (1951-1955).
64. Joseph V. D. Stalin, the Soviet Premier (1941-1953).
65. The Potsdam Proclamation deals with the postwar disposition of Germany, It-
aly, Japan, Poland, etc. While Truman and Churchill signed the Proclamation Defining
Terms ForJapanese Surrender, President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, not in
attendance at the conference, only concurred by despatch. See Proclamation Defining
Terms ForJapanese Surrender (July 26, 1945), DEP'T ST. BULL.,July 1945, at 137 [here-
inafter Potsdam Proclamation]. The United Kingdom was originally represented by
Winston Churchill at the Potsdam Conference. Churchill resigned after losing a parlia-
mentary election on July 26, 1945, and was replaced by new Prime Minister Clement
Atlee. See 29 NEW ENCYCLOPaeDIA BRITANNICA 92 (15th ed. 1994).
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we determine. '"66
The intention of the three government leaders expressed at
the time of issuing these two declarations, that Formosa should
be returned to China after Japan surrendered, is not questioned
here. The nature and the legal effect of these declarations,
which may affect the title to Formosa, will be discussed below.
First, the two declarations, by their nature, did not bind the
declaring or their succeeding governments. A joint declaration
of two or more governments, like a communique, is often used
to express the common foreign policy or the common intent of
those governments. Such declaration of common foreign policy
or of common intent does not legally bind the declaring or the
succeeding governments. It certainly does not have the charac-
teristics of a contract in private law, creating a binding obligation
on the governments, let alone on the States which the govern-
ments represent.67
The Cairo Declaration was a statement of common intent of
the three governments. Although the Cairo Declaration showed
an intent to return Formosa to China, Winston Churchill, who
took part in the Cairo Declaration, later emphatically said "[i]t
contained merely a statement of common purpose. '"68 The
Churchill administration Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, also
said that the Declaration was "merely a statement of intention
that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war that
never materialized. '69 Similarly, in May 1955 the Joint Under-
Foreign Secretary R.H. Turton of the Eden Administration, in
responding to the questioning of a Labor Party member,7 ° said
66. Potsdam Proclamation, supra note 65, 8, at 137.
67. For instance, one provision in the Potsdam Proclamation relating to the exclu-
sion of certain Japanese officials after the war was not carried out, and no allied powers
has challenged it. The Potsdam Proclamation contains a provision (Paragraph 6) that
requires the removal and exclusion ofJapanese officials "who have deceived and misled
the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" in public offices. See id. 6.
The exclusion was removed promptly after the Peace Treaty of 1951 was concluded. See
MACARTHUR, supra note 58, at 298.
68. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 901 (emphasis added). Winston Churc-
hill, who had been reelected Prime Minister, made the statement in response to the
assertion of Rev. R. W. Sorensen, a Labor Party member, that Formosa should be
handed over to the Chinese Communists under the Cairo Declaration. See id.
69. Id. at 159.
70. Geoffrey Bing asserted that "the Potsdam Declaration which re-affirmed the
Cairo Declaration . . . was binding upon this Government." 540 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) (1955) 1869.
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that "[t]he Cairo Declaration .. .was couched in the form of a
statement of intention, and as it was merely a statement of inten-
tion, it is merely binding in so far as it states the intent at that
time ... ."" Thus, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proc-
lamation have no binding effect on the governments that made
such declarations.
Second, the two declarations did not effectuate a transfer of
title to Formosa. At the time when the two declarations were
issued, Japan had not yet surrendered. The Allied Powers were
winning the war, but had not yet defeated Japan. One cannot
give something that one does not have. Even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the declarations were considered contrac-
tual promises to offer Formosa to China, they could not effectu-
ate a transfer of Formosa to China. The three governments did
not have title to Formosa and the Pescadores at the time of the
declarations. Nor could they force Japan to transfer the title to
Formosa and the Pescadores before Japan surrendered. Such
transfer could have been made at a postwar settlement in a treaty
only after Japan surrendered.
At a congressional hearing held in May 1951, General Doug-
las MacArthur said "[t]here were certain agreements that were
entered into . . . at Yalta, and other places, but legalistically For-
mosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan,"72 implying that the
Cairo Declaration did not effectuate a transfer of Formosa to
China. The British Joint Under-Foreign Secretary R.H. Turton
also said the "Cairo Declaration ... cannot by itself transfer sov-
ereignty. That document does impose certain moral obligations
on those who take part in it, but it is not really germane to the
present legal argument on what is or is not today the present
sovereignty over Formosa. 7 3
It may be true that, for a period after Japan surrendered,
the Allied Powers intended that Formosa would to be returned
to China in a postwar settlement. They assigned the task of the
post-surrender administration of Formosa to Chiang Kai-shek's
R.O.C. government." The R.O.C. government subsequently be-
71. Id.
72. The General Declines to Say That the U.S. Has Lost the Initiative in Foreign Policy
Matters (Statement of General Douglas MacArthur before a Congressional hearing),
N.Y. TISEs, May 5, 1951, at A7 [hereinafter Gen. MacArthur's Statement].
73. 540 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 1870 (emphasis added).
74. See infta note 95 and accompanying text.
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came embroiled in a civil war with Chinese Communists, which
later formed the P.R.C. government. After the Chinese Commu-
nists forced Chiang Kai-shek's government to Formosa in 1949,
U.S. President Truman, in the Statement on Formosa of January 5,
1950, stated that "[iun keeping with the [Cairo Declaration and
the Potsdam Proclamation], Formosa was surrendered to Gener-
alissimo Chiang Kai-shek and for the past four years the United
States and the other allied powers have accepted the exercise of
Chinese authority over the island. '7 5 U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson also said: "The Chinese have administered Formosa for
four years .... [The] authority in that occupation . . . was re-
garded as in accordance with the commitments."76 While it may
be inferred from the above that the U.S. government intended
that Formosa would be returned to China in a postwar settle-
ment, these statements did not mean that China had acquired ti-
tle to Formosa. In the statements, the U.S. government used the
term "authority" or "authority over the island," and "authority in
that occupation," rather than the term "sovereignty," so as not to
imply that China had title to the territory.77
It is possible that Truman and Acheson made the state-
ments to explain away the responsibility for a possible loss of For-
mosa, in case the Chinese Communists overran the island.78
Subsequently, however, the U.K. and the U.S. governments
changed their positions on Formosa's sovereignty. They
changed their positions because, by aiding North Korea's inva-
sion of South Korea, the P.R.C. government violated the basic
75. Text of Statement on Formosa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1950, at A3 (emphasis added).
76. 540 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 1865. Acheson made the statement on
January 5, 1950. See id. (emphasis added).
77. See id.
78. A Congressional report indicates that the U.S. government, at the time, pre-
pared the way for the abandonment of Formosa to the Chinese Communists. The Re-
port states:
25. The State Department directive of December 23, 1949, was a policy statement calcu-
lated to prepare the way for the abandonment of Formosa to the Chinese Reds. On
December 23, 1949, the U.S. State Department issued hundreds of copies of a
secret directive concerning the attitude to be adopted by our representatives
abroad in respect to Formosa .... [T] his directive was an actual statement of
policy on the part of the United States State Department in which we an-
nounced to our foreign representatives that Formosa was not of strategic im-
portance to the United States and that its control by the Communist forces
would not imperil our position in the Far East.
The Military Situation in the Far East: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services and
Foreign Relations, 82d Cong. 30 (1951).
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principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions pro-
claimed in the Cairo Declaration. In May 1951, British Foreign
Secretary Herbert Morrison made the following policy statement
in the House of Commons:
The Cairo Declaration also proclaimed the intention that Ko-
rea should in due course become free and independent. It
also expressed acceptance of two principles: non-aggression
and no territorial ambitions .... [T]he Prime Minister [At-
lee] went on to remark [on December 14, 1950] that until
China shows by her action that she is not obstructing fulfil-
ment [sic] of the Cairo Declaration in respect of Korea and
accepts the basic principle of that Declaration, it will be diffi-
cult to reach a satisfactory solution of this problem [of For-
mosa] .79
In February 1955, in rebutting a Labor Party member's assertion
that Formosa should be handed over to the Chinese Commu-
nists under the Cairo Declaration, British Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill, who made the Declaration more than a decade
before, said, "since [the Cairo Declaration] was made a lot of
things have happened. The problem of Formosa has become an
international problem in which a number of other [N] ations are
closely concerned."8 The following day, The New York Times
printed the headline, "Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date,
Says Churchill."8'
The U.S. government also changed its position with respect
to the sovereignty over Formosa because of Chinese aggression.
One day after North Korea invaded South Korea,82 U.S. Presi-
dent Truman changed his position. On June 27, 1950, he issued
the Statement on Korea in which he stated:
The [Communists'] attack upon Korea makes it plain ...
that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to
conquer independent [N]ations and will now use armed inva-
sion and war .... [T] he occupation of Formosa by Commu-
nist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pa-
79. 478 PARL. DEB., H.C.'(5th ser.) (1951) 2301-02.
80. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 901.
81. Drew Middleton, Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date, Says Churchill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1955, at Al.
82. See 6 NEW ENCVCLOPXDIA BRITANNICA 962 (15th ed. 1989); see also WORLD ALMA-
NAC 476 (William A. McGeveran Jr. et al. eds., 2004); Foreign Policies Toward Asia, A
Television Interview with Sec'y Acheson (Sept. 10, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1950,
at 463 [hereinafter Acheson Interview].
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cific area and to [U.S.] forces performing their lawful and
necessary functions in that area.
Although the Chinese Communists had not yet formally entered
the Korean War at the time,84 U.S. President Truman regarded
North Korea's invasion of South Korea as part of a broad Com-
munist attack scheme, and considered the Chinese Communist's
invasion of Formosa imminent. He ordered the U.S. Seventh
Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa by the Chinese Commu-
nists.85 U.S. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Dean
Rusk said over the Voice of America, "[t]he Chinese Commu-
nists took part in the preparations for the treacherous North Ko-
rean assault long before it was actually launched. '8 6 U.S. Secre-
tary of State Acheson also changed his earlier position. In a tele-
vision interview in September 1950, he said:
The Cairo Declaration . . .declares that Formosa should be
returned to China. It also declares ... that Korea should be
free and independent. In most of the discussions that we
have about Formosa, we are reminded about the Formosan
part of the Declaration, and both the Chinese and the Rus-
sians forget about the Korean part of the Declaration. Surely,
the Declaration of Cairo is an important factor to be taken
into consideration in the future settlement. But the future
settlement is for the future.8 7
The following year, at the San Francisco Conference for signing
the Peace Treaty, Japan was required to renounce her title to
Formosa without designating a beneficiary. U.S. President Tru-
man again reminded the conference delegates of the Commu-
nists' aggression." Thus, it is clear that neither the R.O.C. gov-
ernment nor the P.R.C. government can claim title to the island
83. President Harry Truman, Statement on Korea, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1950, at Al.
84. The P.R.C. government sent a volunteer army (the "Chinese People's Volun-
teers") to the Korean Peninsula in October of 1950. See 16 NEw ENCYCLOPOeDIA BRITAN-
NICA 143 (15th ed. 1989).
85. See id.
86. Our Contributions to the Peace, Statement by Dean Rusk, Assistant Sec'y for
Far Eastern Affairs (Dec. 29, 1950), DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1951, at 64 (stating that North
Korea invaded South Korea in June of 1950).
87. Acheson Interview, supra note 82, at 463.
88. Truman said: "Unfortunately, today, the world is faced with new threat of ag-
gression. Many of the countries represented here are now engaged in a hard fight to
uphold the United Nations against international lawbreaking." Opening Address by
President Truman (Sept. 4, 1951), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1951, at 447.
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of Taiwan for the State of China, based on the Cairo Declaration
or the Potsdam Proclamation.
D. Post-Surrender Occupation by the R. 0. C. Government
Immediately afterJapan surrendered in August 1945,9 U.S.
President Truman appointed the commander of the South-West
Pacific Forces, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, as the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific." The U.S.
Army, under the command of General MacArthur, occupied the
major islands of Japan91 and the Okinawa islands. The United
States also assumed the post-surrender operations in South Ko-
rea, leaving the operations in North Korea to the Soviet Union,
which had declared war against Japan just a week before Japan
surrendered.9 2 The United States, which occupied the Okinawa
islands, could also have assumed the post-surrender operation in
Formosa, which was a Japanese territory. But immediately after
the Japanese surrender, the U.S. government wanted to recall its
troops as soon as possible.93 The war had lasted too long since
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Most State Department of-
ficials believed that Formosa would be returned to China at a
postwar settlement, pursuant to the Cairo Declaration.94 Thus,
under the direction of the U.S. government, the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, assigned the
task of accepting the surrender of the Japanese commanders in
Formosa to Chiang Kai-shek.95 On October 25, 1945, the Japa-
89. The Emperor of Japan announced the surrender to the people of Japan on
August 15, 1945. See MODERN JAPAN, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, CULTURE & NATION-
ALISM 290 (James L. Hoffman ed., 1998).
90. See Incoming Message, WARX 49571, dated Aug. 14, 1945, from General Mar-
shall to General MacArthur (on file with MacArthur Memorial).
91. The four major islands ofJapan are Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku.
AfterJapan surrendered, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom attempted, in vain,
to divide Japan into several occupied zones, as the Allies had done in Germany. See
MACARTHUR, supra note 58.
92. The Soviet Union declared war againstJapan on August 8, 1945. See Soviet War
Declaration of War on Japan, available at http://metalab.unc.edu/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/
sov-japan-neu.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
93. See KERR, supra note 35.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 44. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated that "[i]n Septem-
ber [of 1945], the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chi-
nese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." 536
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 159. In fact, the assignment was made at the direc-
tion of the State Department. Before Japan surrendered, General MacArthur received
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nese Commander Ando Rikichi surrendered his authority in
Formosa to the R.O.C. government's representative General
Chen Yi, and the R.O.C. government assumed the post-surren-
der operation of Formosa.96 On December 8, 1949, the R.O.C.
government, having lost the civil war to the Communist Chinese,
was forced to move its government seat to Formosa.97 Since
then, the P.R.C. government, which controls China proper98 ex-
cept Quemoy and Matsu islands, and the R.O.C. government,
which occupies Formosa, have coexisted.
It is common for a victorious army in a war to occupy the
territory of the defeated State. Territory, after all, is an impor-
tant element of the defeated State. The occupation of an en-
emy's territory after the enemy surrenders pending a settlement,
however, does not give the occupying State the title to the terri-
tory that it occupies. 9 As stated earlier, it has become a rule of
customary international law that if title to a territory of the de-
feated State is to be changed after a war, then it must be
achieved by a territorial treaty.'00 The war between Japan and
the Allied Powers did not formally end until April 28, 1952,
when the Treaty of Peace with Japan (the "Peace Treaty of San
Francisco"),' 0 ' to which China is not a party, entered into force.
The war between Japan and China did not end until August 5,
1952, when the Peace Treaty between Japan and China, repre-
from General Marshall on August 13, 1945 four proposed documents prepared by the
U.S. government: (1) Directives to Chief Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;
(2) Proclamation by the Emperor of Japan; (3) Instrument of Surrender; and (4) Gen-
eral Order Number One. Upon Japan's surrender, General Marshall notified General
MacArthur on August 14, 1945 that his directive as Supreme Commander became effec-
tive. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. General Order Number One was issued
in the name of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Em-
peror. It directed that "[t]he senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, Sea, air and
auxiliary forces within China, excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo China
north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
Shek." Incoming Message, WARX 48672, dated Aug. 12, 1945, from General Marshall
to General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (on file with MacArthur Memorial).
96. See KERR, supra note 35, at 78.
97. See id. at 365-66.
98. The term "China proper" refers to the territory legally owned by China, includ-
ing two offshore islands, Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu. It does not include the island
of Taiwan. See supra note 1.
99. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
100. See id.
101. See Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36.
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sented by the R.O.C. government, entered into force.10 2 Thus,
the occupation of Formosa by the R.O.C. government was, until
the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, a military
wartime occupation. 103 In May 1951, six years after assigning the
task of the post-surrender administration in Formosa to the
R.O.C. government, General MacArthur said, "Formosa is still a
part of Japan. "14
Both Labor and Conservative Parties of the British govern-
ments also held the view that China did not acquire title to the
island of Taiwan by occupation. In 1949, British Foreign Secre-
tary Mayhew, in the Atlee (Labor Party) administration, said in
the House that "the Chinese Nationalist authorities . . . are in
control of the island [Formosa. However, any] change in the
legal status of Formosa can only be formally effected in a treaty
of peace with Japan." °5 In 1955, three years after the conclusion
of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden (Conservative Party) restated that "[i]n Septem-
ber, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from
the Japanese by Chinese forces .... [B] ut this was not a cession,
nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty."'106
The Truman Administration's view was that by assigning the
task of the post-surrender operation of Formosa to the R.O.C.
government, the United States, as the leading power of the Al-
lies, created an agency relationship between the Allied Powers as
the principal and the R.O.C. government as the agent, pending
a peace settlement. 7 In August 1950, after the United States
sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and provided military
assistance to the R.O.C.'s Nationalists in Formosa, the Soviet
Union circulated a paper to the members of the U.N. Security
102. China is not a party to the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. John Foster Dulles
said, "[T]he Sino-Japanese War cannot be formally terminated at this occasion [the
signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco]." Sec'yJohn Foster Dulles, Statements at
the Second Plenary Session (Sept. 5, 1951), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1951, at 458. The
Treaty of Peace was signed between the R.O.C. government and Japan on April 28,
1952. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, P.R.C.-Japan, 163 U.N.T.S. 38 [herein-
after Treaty of Peace of 1952].
103. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 541 (1828) ("The usage of the world
is, if a [NJation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory
as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace.").
104. Gen. MacArthur's Statement, supra note 72, at A7.
105. 469 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1679 (1949).
106. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 159 (1955).
107. See Statement on Korea, supra note 83, at Al.
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Council charging the United States with aggression against For-
mosa.
U.S. President Truman instructed U.S. Ambassador Warren
Austin to deliver a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, in which
it stated:
The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from
Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like
other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until
there is international action to determine its future. The Chi-
nese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surren-
der of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason
the Chinese are there now.10 8
This was also the view of U.S. General MacArthur, who
made the assignment. On May 4, 1951, in answering a question
raised by the U.S. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Richard Russell, MacArthur responded,
"[t]he Allies turned over ... the administration and the trustee-
ship of Formosa to China, just as Japan was turned over to us,
and it is still in that status."' 9
The British view was also that the R.O.C. government acted
on behalf of the Allied Powers. In 1950, British Foreign Secre-
tary Younger in the Atlee administration stated, "Formosa is still
de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of For-
mosa as such. Following on the surrender ofJapan, the Chinese
Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remain-
ing Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pend-
ing the final determination of its status at a peace settlement."' 1 0
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's statement in the
House in 1955 was even clearer: "[T]he administration of For-
mosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the
direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The
arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a
basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and
did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese." '111
Thus, until the Peace Treaty of San Francisco entered into
108. Letter from Ambassador Austin to Sec'y-Gen. Lie, Aug. 25, 1950, DEP'T ST.
BULL., Sept. 1950, at 412.
109. Gen. MacArthur's Statement, supra note 72, at A7 (emphasis added).
110. 478 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) 60.
111. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 159 (emphasis added).
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force in 1952, Formosa was dejure territory ofJapan. The R.O.C.
government occupied Formosa as an agent of the Allied Powers,
pending a peace settlement. The agency relationship would
have terminated if the title to Formosa had been transferred to
China in a peace treaty under negotiation at the time.
The political leaders of the United Kingdom and the
United States recognized the rule of international law that any
change of title to a territory of the defeated State after a war is
achieved by a treaty. In November 1949, while the R.O.C. gov-
ernment had occupied the island of Taiwan, British Foreign Sec-
retary Mayhew, in answering a question in the House of Com-
mons with respect to the eventual settlement of the Formosa is-
sue, said: "[a] ny change in the legal status of Formosa can only be
formally effected in a treaty of peace with Japan. But what the even-
tual settlement will be is a matter which His Majesty's Govern-
ment cannot decide alone." '12 In July 1950, the succeeding Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary Younger stated that "because of the provi-
sional nature of the present administration of Formosa, it is the
hope of His Majesty's Government that the disposal of Formosa
will be decided, as has always been contemplated, in connection
with the peace settlement, with Japan." '1
The U.S. view, as expressed by its high officials, also sup-
ports this rule. On June 26, 1950, immediately after North Ko-
rea invaded South Korea, U.S. President Truman proclaimed
that "[t]he determination of the future status of Formosa must
await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement
with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." 1 4 In Au-
gust 1950, when the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the
Taiwan Strait to defend Formosa, the Soviet Union charged the
United States with aggression against Formosa. The U.S. govern-
ment rebutted, "[t]he United States has not encroached on the
territory of China."' 15 U.S. General MacArthur also shared the
same view. On May 4, 1951, in answering a question posed by
Senator Russell, asking whether "the status of Formosa [had]
ever been finally determined by any formal treaty," U.S. General
MacArthur answered that it has not." 6 "Legalistically [Formosa]
112. 469 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1949) 1679 (emphasis added).
113. 478 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) 60.
114. Statement on Korea, supra note 83, at Al.
115. Letter from Ambassador Austin to Sec'y-Gen. Lie, supra note 108, at 412.
116. Gen. MacArthur's Statement, supra note 72, at A7.
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is still a part of defeated Japan. The disposition of the various
segments of the Empire ofJapan has not yet been formally deter-
mined."' 17
These statements, made by the general who assigned the
R.O.C. government to assume the task of the post-surrender ad-
ministration of Formosa, and those of the high governmental
officials of the leading Allied Powers not only demonstrate that
the R.O.C. government has not acquired title to the island of
Taiwan by occupation for the State of China, but also attest to
the existence of a rule in international law that if title to a terri-
tory of the defeated State is to be changed after a war, then it
must be achieved by a territorial treaty.1" 8
The nature of the occupation of Formosa by the R.O.C. gov-
ernment before a postwar settlement is threefold. First, the
R.O.C.'s occupation of Formosa is on behalf of the Allied Powers
and lasts until the agency relationship terminates, in which event
the R.O.C. government must cease the occupation of Formosa,
unless the title to Formosa is transferred to the State of China in
postwar settlement. If the title to Formosa had been subse-
quently transferred to the State of China in postwar settlement,
then the R.O.C. government would have occupied it as the
reigning government.
Second, the occupation of Formosa by the R.O.C. govern-
ment does not give the R.O.C. government title to Formosa.
The purpose of occupation of Formosa by the R.O.C. govern-
ment was for a post-surrender operation, and for that purpose
only. The authority of an agent is limited by its mandate given
by the principal. The right of occupation of a territory and the
right to its title are two distinct rights. For instance, in the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 concluded after the Spanish-American
War, Spain relinquished the title to Cuba and the United States
was given the right of occupation pending final resolution with-
out title.11 9
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
119. Treaty of Paris, supra note 36, at 1755. The Treaty provides:
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the
island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States,
the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and dis-
charge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of
its occupation, for the protection of life and property.
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Third, the occupation of Formosa by the R.O.C. govern-
ment does not give the P.R.C. government or the State of China
title to Formosa. In occupying Formosa, the R.O.C. government
acted as an agent of the Allied Powers, not of the P.R.C. govern-
ment or of the State of China. Besides, the R.O.C. government
did not acquire the title to Formosa for itself or for anyone else.
There was no legal ground under which either the P.R.C. gov-
ernment or the State of China could have acquired title to For-
mosa based on the fact that the R.O.C. government occupied
Formosa pending a postwar settlement. In the eyes of the law,
"Formosa [was] still dejurejapanese territory." 2 °
E. The Peace Treaty of San Francisco
In August 1944, while the Allied Powers were engaged in
war with the Axis both in Asia and Europe, the representatives of
the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the R.O.C. government met at Dumbarton
Oaks, Washington, D.C., and had informal conversations on the
formation of an international peace and security organization
after the war to prevent a third world war.121 On April 25,
1945,122 at the U.N. Conference in San Francisco, the United
Nations was formed. 123 China, represented by the R.O.C. gov-
Id.
120. 478 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) 60.
121. See DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1944, at 133. The meetings, which began on August
14, came to be known as the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. See Hungdah Chiu, The
Right of The Republic of China and its 21 Million Chinese People to Participate in the United
Nations, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 247, 248 (1994). The representatives of the United
Kingdom and the United States spoke with the Soviet Union's representatives first, and
then with the Chinese representatives separately. See id.
122. The date of the conference was set by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
the U.K Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the U.S.S.R. Marshal Joseph Stalin at
the Crimea Conference held between February 4 and February 11, 1945.
123. See U.N. CHARTER; see also United Nations Conference on International Or-
ganization (Apr. 25, 1945), DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1945, at 789. The Charter was signed
on June 26, 1945 by 50 countries. The United Nations officially came into existence on
October 24, 1945. See The United Nations, About the United Nations, available at http:/
/www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004); see also RUTH B. Rus-
SELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1945,
964 (1958) (providing in-depth coverage of the formation of the U.N. CHARTER).
Before the date of the Conference, President Franklin Roosevelt died (April 12, 1945),
and Vice President Harry S. Truman became the 33rd U.S. President. See JOSEPH N.
KANE, PRESIDENTIAL FACT BOOK 215 (1999).
[Vol. 28:1
ONE-CHINA POLICY AND TAIWAN
ernment, was one of the original members and also a member of
the Security Council.
In August 1945, when U.S. General MacArthur (as the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers) assigned the R.O.C.
government to receive the surrender of the Japanese com-
manders in Taiwan, the R.O.C. government was still in control of
a large part of China's territory. But, by 1949, that government
had lost control over most of China's territory to the Chinese
Communists in a civil war and taken refuge in Formosa, outside
of China's territory. As stated earlier, the relationship between
the R.O.C. government and the Allied Powers is an agency rela-
tionship. By international law, the Allied Powers, which defeated
Japan, had the authority to dispose ofJapan's territory, or rather
to force Japan to dispose of part of her territory, though such
disposition had to be formalized by a postwar peace treaty.
To prepare a postwar settlement, the Allied Powers began to
prepare for a peace treaty. The United Kingdom and the
United States assumed the task of drafting the treaty. 124 The
drafts were distributed to other Allied Powers for comments, and
exchanges of notes among the parties ensued. The Peace Treaty
of San Francisco, as it came to be known, was signed on Septem-
ber 8, 1951,125 between Japan and the Allied Powers.' 26 China
was neither a party nor a signatory to this treaty. Neither the
R.O.C. government that occupied the island of Taiwan, nor the
P.R.C. government that controlled China proper, signed on be-
half of the State of China.
China did not acquire title to Formosa as a consequence of
the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, which required Japan to dis-
pose of some of her territory, for three reasons: first, the Allied
Powers did not intend China to receive title to Formosa; second,
124. The United Kingdom and the United States each produced a text of its own
before they jointly drafted a reconciled text. Sec'yJohn Foster Dulles, Statements at the
Second Plenary Session, supra note 102, at 452-54.
125. See Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36.
126. The following countries signed the Peace Treaty with Japan as Allied Powers:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Co-
lumbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Li-
beria, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. See id.
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China was not a party to the Treaty; and third, title to Formosa
did not revert to China.
The first reason China did not acquire title to Formosa as a
consequence of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco is that the
Allied Powers did not intend China to receive title. Even though
the R.O.C. government had administered the affairs of Formosa
for six years when the Peace Treaty of San Francisco was con-
cluded, the Allied Powers did not intend to confer title to For-
mosa to China in the Peace Treaty.
The Peace Treaty of San Francisco is a territorial treaty.
The only provision that deals with the territory of Formosa is
Article 2 (b), which provides, 'Japan renounces all right, title and
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." 127 China did not receive
title to Formosa by any interpretation of the Treaty. There are
two approaches in interpreting a treaty: the objective approach
and the subjective approach. 128
Under the objective approach, i.e., by the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the treaty, China did not receive title to For-
mosa under the language of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco.
The Treaty does not use the word "cede," which is the word cus-
tomarily used in a territorial treaty to transfer a territory. In-
stead, it uses the word "renounce." The plain and ordinary
meaning of the word "renounce" is "to give up,' ' 129 "to aban-
don."' ° It has the same meaning as the word "relinquish" em-
ployed in the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United
States.' 3 1 Moreover, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco does not
mention any transferee. For that reason, no State could receive
any right or title to Formosa under the Treaty according to its
terms.
127. Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36, art. 2(b).
128. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 239-40.
129. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICrIONARY 991 (10th ed. 1996) (defining
renounce as "to give up"); see also OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTriONARY 991 (5th ed.
1995) (providing definition of renounce as "to abandon").
130. See OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARv, supra note 129, at 991.
131. See Treaty of Paris, supra note 36. In the Treaty, Spain relinquished its sover-
eignty over Cuba. In January 1955, Secretary of State John Dulles, said, "[Formosa and
the Pescadores] became part of the Japanese Empire in 1895. They continued as such
for half a century, until they were relinquished by Japan as a result of her defeat in war
.... " Sec'yJohn Foster Dulles, Our Foreign Policies in Asia, Address before the Foreign
Policy Association (Feb. 16, 1955), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1955, at 329 (emphasis
added).
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Under the subjective approach of interpretation, i.e., the in-
tention of the parties to the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, it is
clear that the parties did not intend for China to receive title to
Formosa. The United Kingdom and the United States had
changed their positions with respect to the intent announced in
the Cairo Declaration, and instead, decided to leave the future
of Formosa undetermined. Accordingly, they wanted Japan to
relinquish title to Formosa, but did not want China to receive it.
The use of the word "renounce" in disposing the title to For-
mosa was not without careful deliberation of the drafters of the
Peace Treaty of San Francisco."3 2 The government of the Soviet
Union, in its memorandum to the U.S. Ambassador,133 com-
mented,
In the meantime the [U.S.] draft treaty and the memoran-
dum of the United States of America of May 19 testify to the
fact that the Government of the United States is going on
with direct violation of the national rights of China with re-
spect to its territory in refusing to fulfilling the Cairo agree-
ment regarding the return of Taiwan island and the Pescado-
res Islands to China as well as with exclusion of China from
preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.1 34
Likewise, the government of India was fully aware that For-
mosa was not to be returned to China under the draft Peace
Treaty of San Francisco. 1 35 In its memorandum to the U.S. De-
partment of State,"3 6 the Indian government expressed its intent
not to participate in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, on the
ground, among others, that,
[T]he Government of India attach[es] the greatest impor-
tance to the Treaty providing that the Island of Formosa
should be returned to China. The time and manner of such
return might be the subject of separate negotiations but to
leave the future of the Island undetermined, in spite of past inter-
national agreements, in a document which attempts to regu-
late the relations ofJapan with all Governments that were en-
132. See The San Francisco Conference on Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty (Aug.
15, 1951), DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1951, at 346.
133. See Memorandum of the U.S.S.R., (June 10, 1951), U.S.S.R.-U.S., DEP'T ST.
BULL., June 1951, at 138.
134. Id. at 142.
135. See India Refuses To Be Party to Treaty, Memorandum of India, Aug. 23,
1951, India-U.S., DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1951, at 386.
136. See id.
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gaged in the last war against her does not appear to the Gov-
ernment of India to be either just or expedient. 137
At the Conference in San Francisco for signing the Peace
Treaty, John Dulles, who drafted the Treaty, referring to the dis-
position of Formosa, remarked,
[A]rticle 2 . . . merely delimit[s] Japanese sovereignty.
[S]pecify[ing] precisely the ultimate disposition of each of
the ex-Japanese territories... [w] ould have been neater. But
... the Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what
Japan is... required to give up .... The wise course was...
leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international
solvents other than this Treaty. 3 8
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who presided at the Con-
ference, added at the closing of the Conference, "[w]e signed
this great treaty this morning, but we must live this treaty from
this day on," well aware that the fate of Formosa was not decided
by the treaty.139 Thus, it was clear to all the States involved that
the Allied Powers did not intend China to acquire the title to
Formosa under the Peace Treaty of San Francisco.
The attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States
toward the Taiwan problem has changed over the years. At the
Cairo Conference of 1943, the U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt
and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill intended to
return Formosa to China after the war with Japan ended. Subse-
quent to Japan's surrender, however, the two leading Allied Pow-
ers changed their position due to the aggression of the P.R.C.
government, and simply required Japan to renounce her title to
Formosa in the Peace Treaty.
The second reason China did not acquire title to Formosa
as a consequence of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco is that
China was not a party to the Treaty. Under the general rule
mentioned earlier, only a party to the treaty can transfer or re-
ceive title to a territory in a territorial treaty. The Peace Treaty
of San Francisco is more specific. Article 25 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty
shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State
137. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
138. Sec'y John Foster Dulles, Statements at the Second Plenary Session, supra
note 102, at 454.
139. Id. at 460.
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which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any
right, title or interest ofJapan be deemed to be diminished or
prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State
which is not an Allied Power as so defined.1 4
0
According to Article 23, China was not a party to the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco. Article 23 provides,
The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign
it, including Japan, and will come into force to all the States
which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification
have been deposited by Japan and by the majority, including
the United States of America as the principal occupying
Power, of the following States, [here appear the names of
such of the following States as signatories to the present
Treaty] namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America.' 4 1
China is not mentioned in Article 23. It is not an Allied Power as
defined in the first paragraph of Article 25, which provides that,
"[f] or the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall
be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously
formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23,
provided in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the
Treaty."1
42
China could not receive title to Formosa under an excep-
tion to Article 25 either. The exception is in Article 21, which
provides, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the
present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles
10 and 14(a)2 .... "1 4 Article 10 deals with the rights and inter-
ests of Japan in China, not with Japanese territories. Article 10
provides,
Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, in-
cluding all benefits and privileges resulting from the provi-
sions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7,
1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary
thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of
140. Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36, art. 25, at 74.
141. Id. art. 23.
142. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
143. Id. art. 21.
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the said protocol, annexes, notes and document.'4 4
Article 14 deals with reparations and acceptance of surrender,'45
not with territory. Thus, because China was not a party to the
Treaty and not an Allied Power under the Treaty, China could
not receive the title to a territory owned by Japan.
The third reason why China did not acquire title to Formosa
as a consequence of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco is that the
title to Formosa did not revert to China as a result of the
Treaty. 4 6 Title to Formosa did not revert to China for two rea-
sons. First, the Allied Powers did not intend that title to For-
mosa revert to China as a consequence of the Peace Treaty of
San Francisco. Second, no provisions in the Peace Treaty of San
Francisco can be interpreted to result in a reversion of title to
Formosa to China. The Peace Treaty of San Francisco does not
revoke the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Treaty of Shimonoseki is
a territorial treaty, which as stated before, cannot be revoked.' 4 7
Nor does the Peace Treaty of San Francisco claim to do so. It
does not even mention the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
Article 2(b) of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco does not
result in reversion. 48 The language in Article 2(b), in which Ja-
pan renounces her title to Formosa, and the language in Article
2(c), in which Japan renounces the title to part of the Sakhalin
Island, are different and distinguishable. 49 With respect to Sa-
khalin and the islands adjacent to it, Article 2(c) provides that
'Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands,
and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it
over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the
Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.11150 The reference
to the Treaty of Portsmouth could have created an unexpected
result if the leading Allied Powers did not intend the Soviet
Union to acquire title to those territories. The rights and title
renounced are specific, i.e., those acquired in the Treaty of
Portsmouth from Russia. When Japan renounced all rights, title,
and claim acquired in the Treaty of Portsmouth from Russia,
144. Id. art. 10.
145. See id. art. 14.
146. See Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36.
147. See supra notes 36-37, 51 and accompanying text.
148. See Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36, art. 2(b).
149. See id. arts. 2(b)-(c).
150. Id. art. 2.
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these rights, title, and claim would terminate and title to these
territories would revert to Russia, or its successor, the Soviet
Union, if the Soviet Union had been a party to the Peace Treaty
of San Francisco. 151 Furthermore, with respect to the title to
Formosa and the Pescadores, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco
does not require Japan to renounce the rights, title, and claim
which it acquired in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In Article 2 (b),
Japan simply renounces the title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores without reference to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It
does not require Japan to renounce her rights and title acquired in
the Treaty of Shimonoseki from China. The language in Article
2 (b) of this Treaty is similar to that in Article 2 (f), in which 'Ja-
pan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and
the Paracel Islands."'15 2 In these two provisions,Japan renounces
her claim to the territories without qualification and without any
attempt to transfer their title, but leaving it unresolved.
Nor did the provision in Article 10 of the Peace Treaty of
San Francisco result in a reversion of title to Formosa to China.
151. Article 2(c) could have resulted in a reversion of title of Southern Sakhalin to
the Soviet Union only if the Soviet Union had been a party to the Peace Treaty of San
Francisco. See Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36, art. 25; see also supra note
126. Although the Soviet Union was originally named a party to the Peace Treaty of
San Francisco in Article 23, it refused to sign the Treaty. See Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 11 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y 63, 76 (2002). Since Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers, the Soviet Union
has occupied the Kurile Island and Southern Sakhalin, as well as four small islands
north of Hokkaido, which Japan claims to be her territories proper. See id. However,
the Soviet Union, and its successor, the Russian Federation, will not acquire the title to
Southern Sakhalin until it concludes a peace treaty withJapan. See id. The Soviet Union
refused to sign the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, partly because the leading Allied
Powers refused to put in Article 2(c) of the Treaty which states that title to these territo-
ries is explicitly transferred to the Soviet Union on the ground that the Soviet Union
had not fulfilled the Yalta Agreement. See id. at 102-03. John Dulles explained as fol-
lows:
As regards South Sakhalin and the Kurile Island, the treaty carries out the
provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms, the only agreement by which Ja-
pan and the Allied [P]owers as a whole are bound. So long as other Govern-
ments have rights under the Yalta Agreement which the Soviet Union has not
fulfilled, there is at least questions as to whether the Soviet Union can, with
"clean hands," demand fulfillment of the parts of that agreement it likes.
Sec'y John Foster Dulles, Answer to Soviet Charges Against Japanese Treaty (Sept. 3,
1951), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1951, at 462. If the leading Allied Powers intended the
Soviet Union not to acquire title to Southern Sakhalin, as well as the Kurile Island, in
the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, the intention would be more clearly expressed if
Article 2(c) did not refer to the Treaty of Portsmouth. See Lee, supra, at 107-08.
152. Peace Treaty of San Francisco, supra note 36, art. 2(f), at 48.
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Article 10, in which Japan renounces certain "special rights and
interests ... and agrees to the abrogation of certain documents,"
deals with Japan's rights and interests in China, not with the ter-
ritory of Japan. 155
In summary, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco leaves the
Treaty of Shimonoseki intact. It does not affect the validity of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in which Japan acquired title to For-
mosa. The fact that the Treaty requires Japan to renounce title
to Formosa indicates that it recognizes the validity of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki. 15 4 For the three reasons discussed above, China
undoubtedly did not acquire title to Formosa as a consequence
of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco.
The Peace Treaty of San Francisco has two implications.
First, the Treaty did not carry out the war time intention of the
three governments announced in the Cairo Declaration. The Al-
lied Powers, who signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, for-
mally rejected the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclama-
tion regarding the return of Formosa to China. British's Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden, stated in the House of Commons,
In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the Allies stated
that it was their purpose 'that all the territories which Japan
has stolen from the Chinese such as . . . Formosa and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China . . . '
This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa
should be retroceded to China after the war. This retroces-
sion has, in fact, never taken place ....
Second, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco did not termi-
nate the agency relationship of the R.O.C. government and the
Allied Powers. The status of the R.O.C. government as an agent
of the Allied Powers was unchanged because China did not ac-
quire title to Formosa as a consequence of the Treaty. Under
the general principles of law recognized by civilized Nations,
agency status does not change unless and until it is termi-
nated. 156
153. Id. art. 10.
154. See Chiang, supra note 7, at 995.
155. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 159.
156. The agency relationship may be terminated by mutual consent or by either
party. In any event, the agent cannot retain the possession of the territory. See generally
Gov't Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.
1996).
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A U.S. policy maker confirmed that the agency status of the
R.O.C. government was not terminated by, at, or after the sign-
ing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. In 1955, U.S. Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles in Eisenhower's157 administration
said, "[i]n 1945, [t]he Republic of China was entrusted with au-
thority over (Formosa and the Pescadores), '158 and 'General
Chiang [Kai-shek] was merely asked to administer them (Formosa
and the Pescadores) for the Allied and associated powers pending a
final decision as to their ownership.'" 159 The British view was
the same. In 1955, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in
the House stated that " [i]n September (of 1945), the administra-
tion of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese
forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied
powers .... The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put
him there on a basis of military occupation pending further ar-
rangements." 60 In the same year, the British Joint Under-For-
eign Secretary R.H. Turton, also said, "Formosa['s] sovereignty
was Japanese until 1952. The Japanese Treaty entered into
force, and at that time Formosa was being administered by the
Chinese Nationalists, to whom it was entrusted in 1945, as a mili-
tary occupation .... This military occupancy could not give [the
Chinese Nationalists] legal sovereignty." '161 In the words of Brit-
ish Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "Chiang Kai-shek... took
refuge upon Formosa."' 16 2
Both the U.K. and the U.S. views were expressed in 1955,
four years after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Fran-
cisco. It is clear that both leading Allies did not regard the
R.O.C. government's agency status terminated by, at the time of,
or after the Peace Treaty, notwithstanding that the R.O.C. gov-
ernment had continued to occupy the island of Taiwan. No offi-
cial statement or act of the R.O.C. governments, the United
157. Dwight Eisenhower, the U.S. President (1953-1961).
158. See Sec'yJohn Foster Dulles, Our Foreign Policies in Asia, supra note 131, at
329 (emphasis added).
159. James Reston, New Formosa Bid, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 7, 1955, at Al (emphasis ad-
ded).
160. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 159.
161. 540 PARa. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 1871 (emphasis added).
162. 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) 494. Churchill said, "Chiang Kai-shek
who . . . was driven out of his country by a Communist revolution . . . and who took
refuge upon Formosa, where he still remains [in 1954]." Id.
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Kingdom, or the United States has terminated, or attempted to
terminate, the agency relationship.
F. The Post-Treaty Interpretations of the Leading Allies
After the Peace Treaty of San Francisco was concluded, the
governments of the two leading Allied Powers that signed the
Peace Treaty, the United Kingdom and the United States, had
occasion to interpret the Peace Treaty with respect to sover-
eignty over Formosa. 163 Both governments agreed that no State
had acquired sovereignty over Formosa because the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco merely left Formosa abandoned, leaving
the sovereignty over Formosa undetermined.
The Eisenhower Administration regarded the sovereignty
over Formosa as not settled by the Peace Treaty of San Francisco.
In February 1955, when the United States signed a mutual de-
fense treaty with the R.O.C. government, U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, in urging the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty,
remarked, "[t] echnical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pesca-
dores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese
peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right
and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined
by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace
treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and
Japan. '164
The U.K. government's official position was the same -
that China did not acquire Formosa in the Peace Treaty of San
Francisco. In 1955, in response to a Laborite's suggestion in the
British House of Commons that Formosa should be handed over
to Communist China pursuant to the Cairo Declaration, British
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said:
[Formosa and the Pescadores] have been in Chinese Nation-
alist hands ever since the Japanese surrender in 1945....
[Formosa and the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu] have
always been treated as separate issues .... Formosa has never
in this century been a part of China and the status of Formosa
... was dealt with by the Treaty of San Francisco, signed by
163. The United Kingdom and the United States are the "cosponsors of the text."
Sec'y Dean Acheson, Opening Statement Before the San Francisco Conference (Sept.
5, 1951), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1951, at 450.
164. Sec'y John Foster Dulles, Remarks at News Conference on the Purpose of
Treaty with R.O.C. (Dec. 1, 1954), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1954, at 896.
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the [Atlee] Government .... The offshore islands [Quemoy
and Matsu] have always been .regarded, and are now re-
garded, by us as part of China .... [The] distinction which
... the House should carefully maintain. 165
A week later, it was reported that British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, who participated in the Cairo Declaration, said that
the future of the island was now an international problem and
the question of its future sovereignty was left undetermined by
the Japanese peace treaty.1 6 6 British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden confirmed Churchill's statement in the British House of
Commons. Eden said:
[u]nder the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally re-
nounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pesca-
dores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese
sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to
the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pesca-
dores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government,
territory the dejure sovereignty over which is uncertain or un-
dermined.1 6 7
The British Joint Under-Foreign Secretary R. H. Turton reiter-
ated the U.K. position in the House of Commons in May of
1955.168 Likewise, British Prime Minister Churchill did not con-
sider Formosa part of China when he said, "Chiang Kai-shek who
... was driven out of his country by a Communist revolution...
took refuge upon Formosa, where he still remains." '169 Thus, the
two leading Allied Powers were in consensus on the meaning of
the term of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco disposing the title
to Formosa - that China did not acquire the title to Formosa as
a consequence of the Treaty.
It is also significant that the two leading Allies agreed that
the R.O.C. government had not acquired tide to Formosa by oc-
cupation. Both governments made the statement that China
had not acquired title to Formosa after the R.O.C. government
had continued to occupy Formosa for five years subsequent to
165. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 158, 160. The Treaty was signed on
Sept. 8, 1951, and went into force on Apr. 28, 1952.
166. See Drew Middleton, Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date, Says Churchill, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1955, at Al.
167. 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 159.
168. See 540 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 1871.
169. 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) 494.
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the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. Thus, it is
beyond dispute that China has not acquired title to Formosa
through the post Peace Treaty occupation by the R.O.C. govern-
ment.
Since the governments of the two leading States made those
statements, no factual or legal event has taken place that would
have changed the legal status of Formosa and have given China
title to Formosa.
G. The Mutual Defense Treaty
In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his R.O.C. government fled to
the island of Taiwan after defeat at the hand of Chinese Commu-
nists. In 1954, in order to defend Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan
against the possible invasion by the P.R.C. government, the U.S.
government and the R.O.C. government signed a mutual de-
fense treaty." 7
The conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty did not effect
a transfer of the island of Taiwan to China, according to U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In February 1955, Dulles,
urging the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty, rejected a suggestion
that signing a mutual defense agreement with R.O.C. President
Chiang Kai-shek would change the legal status of Formosa and
the Pescadores and give the Nationalists (the R.O.C. govern-
ment) sovereignty over them. Dulles said that the Eisenhower
administration "does not regard the sovereignty of Formosa and
the Pescadores as . . . settled and the [Mutual Defense T]reaty
would not give General Chiang sovereignty over these is-
lands." '171 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman,
Senator Walter F. George, asserts the committee's "understand-
ing" of the treaty as follows: "Senate approval of the Treaty
would neither strengthen nor weaken the Chiang Governmen's
[sic] claim to sovereignty over Formosa, the international status
of which is yet to be decided." '172
The British interpreted the Mutual Defense Treaty in the
same way. To a House member's argument that the United
170. See Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.-China (the R.O.C. govern-
ment), 6 U.S.T. 433.
171. Reston, supra note 159, at Al.
172. William S. White, Senate Approves Formosa Treaty, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1955, at
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States would give formal recognition of Formosa and the Pesca-
dores as territories of the Republic of China by signing the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty with the R.O.C. government, the British
Joint Under-Foreign Secretary Turton in the Eden administra-
tion rebutted: "It is clear from what Mr. Dulles said at the time
of signing of the Treaty that he was in no conflict with us on the
legal interpretation of the position." '173
H. Peace Treaties Between China and Japan
After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco,
Japan concluded two peace treaties with China - one, the
Treaty of Peace, with the R.O.C. government in 1952,174 and the
other, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with the P.R.C. gov-
ernment in 1978.175
The Treaty of Peace of 1952 signed by Japan and the R.O.C.
government is not a territorial treaty because it does not dispose
of a territory. Although the Treaty of Peace of 1952 ended the
war between China and Japan, it does not address title to For-
mosa, but simply confirms Japan's disposition in the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco. Article II of the Peace Treaty of 1952
provides:
It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United
States of America on September 8, 1951, Japan has re-
nounced all right, titles and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and
Penghu (The Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and
Paracel Islands.1 76
By recognizing that Japan had abandoned Formosa, the R.O.C.
government accepted Japan's action as officially valid. Not only
did the State of China not acquire the title to Formosa under the
Peace Treaty of 1952, but the R.O.C. government, representing
the State of China also formally accepted the disposition of For-
mosa by the Peace Treaty of San Francisco without claiming the
island as China's territory. This result was confirmed by U.S.
173. 540 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1955) 1865, 1870-71.
174. See Treaty of Peace of 1952, supra note 102. The R.O.C. government, in sign-
ing the treaty, represented the State of China.
175. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Aug. 12, 1978, Japan-P.R.C., 1981 U.N.T.S.
269 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace and Friendship]. The P.R.C. government, in signing
the treaty, represented the State of China.
176. See Treaty of Peace of 1952, supra note 102, art. II.
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who said, " [T]he future
title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it de-
termined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the
Republic of China and Japan." '177
The second treaty, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship,
signed by Japan and the P.R.C. government 7 ' in 1978, does not
confer Formosa's title to China either. In 1972, before the con-
clusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Japanese gov-
ernment and the P.R.C. government issued ajoint Communique
in which the government of Japan stated that "it fully under-
stands and respects the P.R.C. government's stand that [Taiwan
is a part of its territory] and that [the P.R.C. government] main-
tains its stand under the Potsdam Proclamation. '17' This Joint
Communiqu6 is not a territorial treaty. As discussed before, it
cannot effect a transfer of a territory. The Treaty of Peace and
Friendship signed by Japan and the P.R.C. government in 1978
is not a territorial treaty, and it does not even mention the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco or Formosa.
Under the general principles of law, China did not acquire
title to the island of Taiwan under either the two treaties be-
tween Japan and China, or the Joint Communique of the Japa-
nese government and the P.R.C. government because Japan,
having renounced her title and claim to the island of Taiwan in
the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, no longer had any title or
right to the island of Taiwan to give away at the time of conclud-
ing the two treaties or issuing the Joint Communique.
III. SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN
A. China's Claim of Sovereignty Over Taiwan
Since the P.R.C. government was established in October of
1949,180 it has claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, which has been
occupied by the R.O.C. government since 1945, and to where
the R.O.C. government has moved its seat in 1949 after its defeat
177. DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1954, at 896.
178. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 175.
179. Joint Communiqu6 of the Government of Japan and the Government of the
P.R.C. (Sept. 29, 1972), available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/japan0l.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
180. The government was established on October 1, 1949. See Ma Feng, A Nation
Celebrates Its New Beginning, TIME, Sept. 27, 1999, available at http://www.time.com/
time/asia/magazine/99/0927/beijing.html.
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in China proper. In an official statement, called P.R. C. White Pa-
per-The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue ("2000 White Pa-
per"), 8 the P.R.C. government claims that "after replacing the
government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government
of the P.R.C. has become the sole legal government of China,
enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, in-
cluding Taiwan." 182
Because the modern State is based on territory, China's
claim of sovereignty over Taiwan is necessarily predicated on its
claim of title to the island of Taiwan. In August 1950, the
P.R.C.'s Foreign Minister sent a cablegram to the U.N. Secretary-
General Trygve Lie, claiming that "Taiwan is an integral part of
China."1 8 3 In the 2000 White Paper, the P.R.C. government for-
mulated the term "one-China principle" in which it claimed that
Taiwan is a part of China.18
4
In general, the P.R.C. government claims the island of Tai-
wan on three grounds: historical ownership, abrogation of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the Cairo Declaration. 18 5 None of
these grounds are valid in international law.
The first ground is historical ownership. It claims that the
island of Taiwan was originally owned by China, and therefore, is
now China's territory. There is no rule in international law
which lends support to such a claim. Regardless of the length of
time during which China's governments had effective control of
the island of Taiwan, international law does not recognize a
claim of a territorial title based on the historical ownership. If
such a ground were valid for a claim of a territory, it would nul-
lify all treaties in which territories were ceded.
The second ground that the P.R.C. government uses to
claim the island of Taiwan is that the Treaty of Shimonoseki186
181. 2000 White Paper, supra note 53.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Cablegram from Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister, P.R.C. to Sec'y-Gen. Trygue
Lie, United Nations (Aug. 24, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1950, at 607 [hereinafter
Chou En-Lai Cablegram].
184. See 2000 White Paper, supra note 53. The R.O.C. government also controls two
small islands, Queymoy and Matsu, off the Chinese coast. These islands are not part of
the island of Taiwan and are Chinese territories. See supra notes 1, 98.
185. See Chou En-Lai Cablegram, supra note 183.
186. See Treaty of Shimonoseki, supra note 48. In the Treaty, China ceded For-
mosa and the Pescadores (together called, the "island of Taiwan") to Japan.
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was abrogated.' 87 The P.R.C. government claims that the R.O.C.
government abrogated the "unequal" Treaty of Shimonoseki by
a proclamation when 'Japan launched an all-out war of aggres-
sion against China" in 1941.188 As explained earlier, such a proc-
lamation to abrogate the Treaty is not valid,189 and a succeeding
government cannot claim what its predecessor could not do.
Furthermore, after a territorial treaty is concluded, a subsequent
aggressive act of a party to the treaty, Japan, does not affect the
validity of the treaty. 190
The third ground which the P.R.C. government claims as a
basis for ownership of the island of Taiwan is the Cairo Declara-
tion. The P.R.C. government claims that the Allies in the 1943
Cairo Declaration promised the return of Formosa and Pescado-
res to China after the war. Such ground is again unfounded. As
explained before, the Cairo Declaration reflected wartime pol-
icy of the Allies. The Allies subsequently changed that policy,
and in the 1951 Peace of Treaty of San Francisco, which over-
rode the Cairo Declaration, forced Japan to renounce title to the
island of Taiwan without designating any transferee. It is ironic
that in their repeated claim of title to the island of Taiwan,
neither the P.R.C. government nor the R.O.C. government ever
mention the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, which is the control-
ling document.
In summary, the P.R.C. government's claim of title to the
island of Taiwan is notjustified under international law. As ana-
lyzed herein, China never reacquired title to the island of Tai-
wan by any recognized means in international law: it did not
acquire it under the Cairo Declaration; it did not acquire it by
the Peace Treaty of San Francisco or any other treaty. Further-
more, China has not acquired it by occupation. The R.O.C. gov-
ernment occupied the island of Taiwan, neither for the State of
China nor for the P.R.C. government, but as an agent of the
Allies. After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Fran-
cisco, the R.O.C. government continues to administer the affairs
of Taiwan on behalf of the Allies. This agency relationship has
never been terminated.
187. See 2000 White Paper, supra note 53.
188. Id.
189. See Scourr, supra note 54.
190. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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B. The U.S. Position on Taiwan
As previously discussed, the position of the Truman and the
Eisenhower Administrations, as well as that of the contempora-
neous British governments, is that no State, including China, has
acquired title to the island of Taiwan after World War II. While
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu are China's territories, the is-
land of Taiwan is not.
After the Peace Treaty of San Francisco entered into force,
the Treaty was self-executory and became the supreme law of the
land under the U.S. Constitution.19" ' The Treaty's disposition of
title to the island of Taiwan binds the subsequent U.S. Adminis-
trations as the controlling law of the United States.9 2 Thus, title
to the island of Taiwan cannot be changed by a policy of an Ad-
ministration.
Although title to a territory cannot be changed by govern-
mental policy, the policy toward China adopted by the U.S. gov-
ernment has profound consequences in international relations
and politics. Political commentators and governmental officials
often describe U.S. policy toward China as the "one-China pol-
icy.""3 Since these commentators and officials used the term
one-China policy without defining it,194 the P.R.C. government
equates the one-China policy with its own one-China princi-
ple.1 1 5 The P.R.C. government accused the U.S. government of
violating China's sovereignty: first, when the U.S. government
sold weapons to the R.O.C. government in Taiwan, 196 and sec-
191. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
192. See DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195 (1901).
193. See, e.g., Television Interview with Sec'y of Defense William Cohen (CNN tele-
vision broadcast, Mar. 10, 2000).
194. See Robert Kaiser, What We Said, What They Said, What's Unsaid, WAsH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2001, at BI.
195. See Anniversary of Shanghai Communiqu: Sino-US "Alliance" Has Increased Ten-
sion, (BBC television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1982).
196. See 2000 White Paper, supra note 53 at 15. "While the Chinese were willing to
state their peaceful policy [toward Taiwan] in strong terms, they at first resisted any
relationship between that policy and our arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted
this relationship because of their view that the sale of arms to Taiwan constitutes an interfer-
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ond, when it gave a visa to R.O.C.'s President Lee Teng-hui for a
private visit to the United States. 197
The following review of U.S policy toward China of various
U.S. Administrations will reveal that the U.S. one-China policy is
different from China's one-China principle in that the U.S.'s
one-China policy does not, like the one-China principle, recog-
nize that the island of Taiwan is China's territory.
Neither U.S. President John F. Kennedy, 198 who succeeded
Eisenhower, nor U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson,199 who suc-
ceeded Kennedy, changed the U.S. position on title to the island
of Taiwan. Both Administrations refused to recognize the P.R.C.
as the representative government of China and blocked the at-
tempts by the Soviet bloc to replace the R.O.C. government with
the P.R.C. government in the United Nations. Yet, although
both Administrations recognized the R.O.C. government seated
on the island of Taiwan as the representative government of
China, they never proclaimed the island of Taiwan to be China's
territory.
Nor did U.S. President Nixon,200 who succeeded Johnson,
agree with the P.R.C. government's claim that the island of Tai-
wan was China's territory. Nixon's policy toward China was ex-
pressed in the Shanghai Communiqu6 of 1972 ("Shanghai Com-
muniqu'"). 20' A brief review of the circumstances under which
the Shanghai Communique was issued provides some insight to
the meaning of the statements made by the U.S. government in
the Communiqu&
Immediately after the P.R.C. government was established,
the U.S. policy toward the Communist regime was one of rejec-
tion and containment. When U.S. President Nixon took office
in 1969, and throughout his presidency, the U.S. government
ence in China's internal affairs." John H. Holdridge, Address before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (Aug. 18, 1982), in DEPr. ST. BULL., Oct. 1982, at 19 (emphasis ad-
ded).
197. See 2000 White Paper, supra note 53, at 9. Lee Teng-hui visited the United
States in 1995. See Barbara Franklin, China: Friend or Enemy?, Lecture Before the Heri-
tage Foundation (June 20, 1996), available at http://wwv.heritage.org/research/asia
andthepacific/h1566.cfm.
198. John F. Kennedy, the U.S. President (1961-1963).
199. Lyndon B. Johnson, the U.S. President (1963-1968).
200. Richard M. Nixon, the U.S. President (1969-1974).
201. Joint Communiqu6 (Feb. 27. 1972), in DEP'T ST. BULL., 1972, at 437 (empha-
sis added) [hereinafter Shanghai Communiquh].
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recognized the R.O.C. government in Taiwan as the representa-
tive government of China, even though the P.R.C. government
was in control of China proper. The United States also sup-
ported the R.O.C. government to represent the member-State
China in the United Nations.
Nixon was the first U.S. President to change the U.S. policy
toward the P.R.C. government, which was a former U.S. enemy
in the Korean War, from containment to rapprochement, and
establish official contact with the regime.20 2 Nixon and the
P.R.C. government's leaders at the time each had their own geo-
political and strategic reasons to be, or to at least look, friendly
with each other.211 So, in July 1971, Nixon began a high-level
dialogue with the P.R.C. government by sending Henry Kis-
singer, U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
fairs, to meet with the P.R.C. government leaders in Beijing and
negotiate a meeting of the two government leaders.
Nixon first changed his policy toward the question of
China's representation in the United Nations. Since the early
1960s, debates had already taken place in the U.N. General As-
sembly on whether the P.R.C. government in Beijing should re-
place the R.O.C. government in Taipei occupying China's seat in
the organization. By 1971, the P.R.C. government had been es-
tablished twenty years and it was clear that it was impossible for
the R.O.C. government to "recover the mainland," as Chiang
had repeatedly claimed ever since he was forced to move to Tai-
wan. Realizing this, the Nixon Administration changed the pol-
icy toward the P.R.C. government. But, while Nixon wanted the
P.R.C. government to occupy China's seat, both in the General
Assembly and the Security Council, his intent was to create "dual
representation" and retain the R.O.C. government in the Gen-
eral Assembly.2 4 In 1971, when the U.N. General Assembly con-
vened, the proposal to replace the representatives of the R.O.C.
202. The geopolitical reasons for Nixon to establish some kind of informal rela-
tionship with China included a cease fire in Vietnam and an alliance with China against
Soviet Union. For the reason in the background for the United States government and
the P.R.C. government to make contact, see HENRY KISSINGER, OBSERVATIONS: SELECTED
SPEECHES AND ESSAYS 141 (1982).
203. See id. at 141.
204. The U.S. draft resolution, in part, reads, "the General Assembly, 1. Hereby
affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and recommends
that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council; 2.
Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China." Ambassador
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government with the representatives of the P.R.C. in China's seat
was again made in October.20 5 The attempt to create dual repre-
sentation in the United Nations was not successful. Neverthe-
less, the Nixon Administration voted for the motion to replace
the R.O.C. with the P.R.C. The U.N. General Assembly then
adopted Resolution No. 2758 to expel the representatives of the
R.O.C. government. 2 6
Although the United States voted for the Resolution, the
United States did not change its position on the title to Taiwan.
At a press conference on the morning after the adoption of the
Resolution, a reporter asked U.S. Secretary of State William Rog-
ers, "[I]sn't the vote an implicit acknowledgment that Taiwan is
a province of China, and if so, what would we do if Peking now
asked us to remove our troops from there?" 20 7 Rogers replied,
"Well, I don't want to speculate [about the P.R.C. government
asking us to remove our troops from Taiwan]. We have made
our position clear. Our policy is unaffected by this vote."20 8
The negotiations of Kissinger and the P.R.C.'s government
George Bush, Statements in the Plenary Session (Oct. 18, 1971), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Oct. 1971, at 549.
205. G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8439
(1971). The Proposal stated:
Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the
United Nations
The General Assembly, Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic
of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and for the cause that United Nations must serve under the Charter
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Re-
public of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United
Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council,
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recog-
nize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representa-
tives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representa-
tives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at
United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.
Id.
206. The Resolution is entitled, "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's
Republic of China in the United Nations." G.A. Res. 2758, GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp No.
29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8439 (1971) [hereinafter Resolution No. 2758].
207. Sec'y of State William Rogers, Statements at Press Conference Discussing
United Nations' Decision on Chinese Representation, in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1971, at
541.
208. Id.
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officials included drafting of ajoint declaration to be announced
when Nixon visited China. In February 1972, U.S. President
Nixon and China's Premier Chou Enlai met in Beijing. After the
meeting, the two leaders went to Shanghai where the two gov-
ernments issued a prepared joint declaration, known as the
Shanghai Communique.
The Shanghai Communiqu6 was a unique joint declaration
in world politics and created a problematic U.S. foreign policy.
It was unique because a joint declaration or communiqu6 by two
governments traditionally expresses the common foreign policy
or common view of the two governments on a foreign affair." 9
In the Shanghai Communique, however, the two governments
declared two different views on the same issue. It is problematic
because the statements of the P.R.C. government contain a false
claim and the statement made by the United States creates an
ambiguity which subsequently allowed the P.R.C. government to
make another false claim on the U.S. position toward Taiwan.
The P.R.C. government tried to use the occasion of Nixon's
visit to recover whatever it had lost in the prolonged stalemate
with the United States. After twenty years of stalemate between
the two governments, the P.R.C. government wanted to show the
world that it was the United States that gave in to end the stale-
mate. That Nixon, president of the most powerful Nation on
Earth, would agree to go to China's capital was like an envoy of a
tributary visiting the emperor and paying homage. As for the
tribute, nothing could be better than the U.S. acceptance of the
P.R.C. government's position on the Taiwan issue, which was, af-
ter all, the root of the stalemate.
In the text of the Shanghai Communiqu6, a general intro-
duction is followed by the P.R.C. government's and U.S. govern-
ment's views on Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. On the Taiwan
issue, the P.R.C. government stated,
The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan ques-
tion is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of
relations between China and the United States; the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal gov-
ernment of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has
long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Tai-
209. See Cairo Declaration, supra note 60; see also Potsdam Proclamation, supra
note 65.
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wan is China's internal affair in which no other country has
the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installa-
tions must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Govern-
ment firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation
of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments",
"two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that the
"status of Taiwan remains to be determined." 21 0
There are three basic positions in the P.R.C. government's
statement. The first position is that there is only one State called
China. Accordingly, the Republic of China is not a State and
there is no other State also called China. The second position is
that the government of the People's Republic of China is the
sole legal government of China. Accordingly, the Republic of
China is not the legal government of the State of China. The
third position is that the island of Taiwan is China's territory.
Since the term "province" refers to a territorial and administra-
tive district of China, when the P.R.C. government claims that
"Taiwan is a province of China," it claims that the island of Tai-
wan is China's territory. It is not clear what the statement "Tai-
wan... has long been returned to the motherland" meant from
China's statements in the Shanghai Communiqu6. Later, the
P.R.C. government on February 21, 2000 issued the 2000 White
Paper which explained that Taiwan was returned to China in
1945.211 The 2000 White Paper states, "[O]n October 25, 1945,
the Chinese government [the R.O.C. at the time] recovered Tai-
wan and the Penghu Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sov-
ereignty over Taiwan. '2 12 This position is based on a false claim
because as discussed earlier, China never regained title to the
island of Taiwan after it ceded the island to Japan in 1895.
The P.R.C. government's statement is followed by that of
the U.S. government, which was intended to be a response to the
former. Nixon could not accept most of the P.R.C. govern-
ment's positions; however, if he expected to be greeted by a for-
mer enemy with open arms, he could not reject all the positions
asserted by his host. Of the three positions taken by the P.R.C.
government, Nixon could accept only its first position "[T] here
is only one [S]tate called China," because it was true. In 1972,
210. Shanghai Communique, supra note 201, at 437.
211. See 2000 White Paper, supra note 53.
212. Id.
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when the Shanghai Communiqu6 was being drafted, two govern-
ments, the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., coexisted and both claimed
that there was only one China, even though each one claimed
that it, not the other, represented China. The P.R.C. govern-
ment's position in the text presented no problem to Nixon be-
cause the R.O.C. government in Taiwan did not intend to be-
come another China, 213 and the U.S. government could not do
anything about it.
On the P.R.C. government's second position, "the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal govern-
ment of China," Nixon had difficulty responding. Although the
P.R.C. government had replaced the R.O.C. government repre-
senting China in the United Nations, the U.S. government at the
time still recognized the R.O.C. as the legitimate government of
China. The Nixon Administration could not accept the P.R.C.
government's position. So, the United States decided not to
mention what the legitimate government was in the text.
Nixon could not accept the P.R.C. government's third claim
that Taiwan is China's territory either, even though the R.O.C.
government also made the same claim. The R.O.C. government,
as early as 1941, claimed that Taiwan was a part of China. In that
year, the R.O.C. government unilaterally proclaimed the abroga-
tion of all China's treaties with Japan, including the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, in which China ceded the island of Taiwan to Ja-
pan. Although such a proclamation was not effective in interna-
tional law, the P.R.C. government in the text of the Shanghai
Communiqu6 claimed that Taiwan "has long been returned to
the motherland. 214
Nixon could not accept the P.R.C. government's third posi-
tion because he was aware of the disposition of the title to the
island of Taiwan when the Peace Treaty of San Francisco was
concluded. When John Foster Dulles, who was in charge of
drafting the Treaty, was U.S. Secretary of State during the Eisen-
hower Administration, Nixon was the U.S. Vice President. As a
staunch anti-Communist, Nixon must have been aware of the Ei-
senhower Administration's position on Taiwan. In addition,
213. See Warren I. Cohen, On an Island, with Dreams of the Mainland, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2004, at R13 (reviewing JONATHAN FENBY CARROLL, CHIANG KAI-SHEK: CHINA'S
GENERALISSIMO AND THE NATION HE LOST (2004)). Chiang Kai-shek swore "to recover
the Mainland" until his death in 1975.
214. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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when Nixon went to China in 1972, the Vietnam conflict had not
yet ended. If Nixon was not ready to recognize a regime that
had assisted the North Vietnamese in a military conflict with the
United States as the legitimate government of China, he was
even less willing to accept that regime's claim to Taiwan.
But Nixon, as mentioned, could not flatly reject all of the
P.R.C. government's positions in the text without undermining
his willingness to compromise. The closest word that Nixon
thought of was "acknowledging" the positions taken by the Chi-
nese. The final text in the Communiqu6 turned out to be,
"[t] he U.S. declared: The United Sates acknowledges that all Chi-
nese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States
Government does not challenge that position." '215 In other
words, the Nixon Administration only took notice of what "the
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait" claimed.216 It was
the extent to which Nixon was willing to meet with the P.R.C.
government's demand. This point was confirmed later by the
second Joint Communiqu6 issued by U.S. President Carter in
1979.217 The U.S. statement indicated that Nixon, in drafting
the statement, chose the words carefully, so as not to imply that
the United States accepted or recognized the P.R.C. govern-
ment's position that Taiwan is a part of China. 218 Nixon also
avoided designating who the legitimate government was - the
R.O.C. or the P.R.C. The statement refers to the two governing
authorities as "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
219
The statement "[t]he United States Government does not
215. Shanghai Communique, supra note 201, at 437 (emphasis added).
216. This point is confirmed by Harvey Feldman, a retired ambassador and a se-
nior fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
Because President Carter switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beij-
ing to gain an ally against the Soviet Union, successive administrations have
said the U.S. follows a "one-China policy". But our "policy" is not at all like
Beijing's "principle." Washington's "one-China policy" says we have diplo-
matic relations only with Beijing, though we maintain all other relations with
Taipei, and we "acknowledge" China's claim to the island, but we make no
statement about Taiwan's status.
Harvey Feldman, Commentary: U.S. is Caught Between Two Governments Glaring Across a
One-China Policy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at Bll.
217. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
218. See Shanghai Communique, supra note 201, at 437 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 437-38.
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challenge that position, '220 meant that the U.S. government did
not deny that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait"
assert the same thing, namely that there is only one China. 221 It
does not mean that the U.S. government agreed with the posi-
tion taken by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Although such interpretation is not apparent in the statement
itself, it was also confirmed in the second Joint Communique
issued by U.S. President Carter to be discussed.222 Since the
United States acknowledged, but did not necessarily agree with
the P.R.C.'s position on Taiwan, the P.R.C.'s statements that "the
liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other
country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan" are irrelevant and
require no response from the U.S. side. 221
The Shanghai Communique established the U.S. policy to-
ward China to date. The U.S. policy stated in the Shanghai
Communiqu6 is said to be the one-China policy.224 In this policy
statement, the Nixon Administration did not change the U.S.
position that the island of Taiwan is not China's territory. How-
ever, despite Nixon's reservation, the P.R.C. government distorts
the U.S. statement and claims that the U.S. government in the
Shanghai Communiqu6 "recognizes" its claim that Taiwan is a
part of China.
In fact, the term "one China" appeared in 1970, when the
U.N. General Assembly debated which government should take
China's seat.225 At the time, the P.R.C. government, which had
attempted to replace the R.O.C. government in the United Na-
tions, charged the Japanese and the U.S. governments with plot-
ting to create two Chinas:2 26 the old China in China proper with
220. Id. at 438.
221. Id. at 437-38.
222. The Joint Communiqu6 on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between
the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, (Jan. 1, 1979) [here-
inafter Second Communique], available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/
26243.htm.
223. See Shanghai Communique, supra note 201, at 437.
224. See Franklin, supra note 197.
225. On November 22, 1970, the then Japanese Ambassador, Min Aichi said "that
Japan will continue to espouse the '[One]-China' policy despite closeness of the vote
[in the U.N.]." See N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Nov. 22, 1970, at 9.
226. See N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Feb. 24, 1970, at 6.
Communist China charges US and Japan promote independence movement
in Taiwan to foster policy of 2 Chinas; says they smuggled Peng Ming-min out
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the P.R.C. as its government, and a new China on the island of
Taiwan, with the R.O.C. as its government. Thus, the term "one-
China" was originally used in connection with the conjectured
recognition of a new State and simply meant a policy of not rec-
ognizing the R.O.C. as a second China.
Gerald Ford2 27 took over the presidency after Nixon re-
signed. Ford did not change the China policy established by
Nixon. There was no occasion that required him to issue a pol-
icy statement on title to the island of Taiwan.
The Carter Administration was the first U.S. government
that extended recognition to the P.R.C. as the representative
government of China. On December 15, 1978, U.S. President
Carter 221 withdrew recognition of the R.O.C. and extended rec-
ognition to the P.R.C. as the representative government of
China by establishing diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. gov-
ernment.
But it is important to note that in recognizing the P.R.C.
government, the Carter Administration did not recognize
China's claim over Taiwan. This position is clear in the policy
statement made in the Joint Communiqu6 on Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China ("Second Communique").229
The Carter Administration again, like Nixon's, only "acknowl-
edged" that China claimed title to the island of Taiwan. The
Second Joint Communiqu6 states: "The United States of
America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the princi-
of country to enable him to continue his activities for Taiwan independence;
charges USSR plays "extremely despicable role" in furthering movement; cites
recent visit to Moscow by Newsweek (pub) correspondent and '69 visit to Tai-
wan by Soviet correspondent for London Evening News as further evidence of
Soviet "plotting."
Id. See N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Apr. 19, 1970, at 8.
Canadian Minister Sharp reports Canada and China, in 14-month-old talks on
establishing diplomatic relations, are "moving closer on main question of Tai-
wan;" at issue has been China's initial requirement that Canada back Peking's
claim to Taiwan; Canada reportedly has convinced Peking that it has no secret
desire for two-Chinas policy; Canadian position and possible courses of action
reviewed; Canada seen more anxious than China to establish ties; further is-
sues that remain to be resolved outlined.
Id.
227. Gerald R. Ford, the U.S. President (1974-1976).
228. James E. Carter, Jr., the U.S. President (1977-1981).
229. See Second Communique, supra note 222.
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ples agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqu6,
and emphasize once again that: The government of the United States
of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China
and Taiwan is part of China. 230
The Carter Administration did no more than simply ac-
knowledge that the P.R.C. government maintained the position
that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. The
Carter Administration, by saying that the Second Communiqu6
"reaffirm[s] the principles agreed on by the two sides in the
Shanghai Communique," meant that it continued to uphold the
U.S. position in the Shanghai Communiqu& Thus, the Second
Communiqu6 confirmed the interpretation that the statement
in the Shanghai Communiqu6 stating "[t] he United States Gov-
ernment does not challenge that position" meant that the U.S.
government did not deny the fact that "Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait" took the same position that Taiwan is part of
China.23' Carter did not accept or recognize the position taken
by the P.R.C. government.
When the Carter Administration extended recognition to
the P.R.C. government, the U.S. Congress was concerned for the
security of the people in Taiwan. It enacted the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act to protect them, showing that the United States recog-
nized that Taiwan was not a part of China.232 The Taiwan Rela-
tions Act does not contravene the Treaty of San Francisco with
respect to the disposition of the island of Taiwan ("Formosa and
Pescadores"). Section 2(b) of the Act states,
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests
upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be deter-
mined by peaceful means; (4) to consider any effort to deter-
mine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, in-
cluding by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific are and of grave concern to
the United States; (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defen-
sive character; and (6) to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. Shanghai Communique, supra note 201, at 437-38.
232. See Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2004)).
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system, of the people on Taiwan. 2 33
If the island of Taiwan were China's territory, the P.R.C. govern-
ment would be within China's sovereign power to take the island
by any means, including using force.23 4 On the contrary, item
(4) of Section 2(b) suggests that the island of Taiwan is not
China's territory when it states "[the United States] consider[s]
any effort to determine the future of Taiwan," including acquir-
ing title to the island of Taiwan "by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific. ' 235 Other provisions in the sec-
tion are also inconsistent with the notion that China has title to
the island of Taiwan or sovereignty over Taiwan. From this lan-
guage, it can be concluded that the Taiwan Relations Act treats
the island of Taiwan as a territory not owned by any State.
President Ronald Reagan 2 3 6 who succeeded Carter, contin-
ued to maintain the position that the island of Taiwan is not
China's territory. But Reagan's attempt to work together with
the P.R.C. government "in order to limit the Soviet Union's op-
233. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b), 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2004)).
234. The traditional view of sovereignty is that the State has absolute power to rule
its people. See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, Address as Part of the Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series, 68 FORD-
HAN1 L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1999). In the twentieth century, under the doctrine of human
rights, the sovereign power is not absolute. See Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human
Rights, and Self-Determination: The Meaning of International Law, 24 FORDHAM INr'L LJ.
1477, 1486-89, 1497 (2001). In other words, under this doctrine, other States have the
right to protect the people of a State which abuses human rights of its own people. But
State practice has not uniformly accepted such doctrine. For instance, when the gov-
ernment soldiers of Yugoslavia (Serbia) killed the ethnic people in Kosova, a region
within its own territory, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") intervened
based on the doctrine of human rights of the ethnic people. On the other hand, when
the Russian army killed Chechens in Chechnya, a region within its own territory, no
other State intervened. See generally Fred Weir, Summit Delegates in Istanbul Debate Russia's
Chechen Attacks, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1999.
Chinese leaders think America already agrees that Taiwan is part of China...
For the Chinese, that is half the battle ... If the United States considers Tai-
wan as part of China, . . . then the United States must, ipso facto, recognize
the sovereign right of China to use force to effect the unification of Taiwan
with China.
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews & The Honorable Steve Cabot, Two Congressmen
Look at "One China", Address given at the Heritage Foundation (Sept. 16, 2003), avail-
able at www.heritage.org/asiaandthepacific/h1821.cfm.
235. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b), 93 Stat. 14 (1,979) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2004)).
236. Ronald Reagan, the U.S. President (1981-1989).
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portunities for exploiting its military power" in Asia 237 worried
the R.O.C. government officials. In May 1981, Alexander Haig,
the U.S. Secretary of State, who had already made plans to go to
China, indicated in a speech that the Reagan Administration
sought to improve its relations with China.238 In June 1981 when
Haig was in Beijing, at a news conference after meeting with the
Chinese leaders, he said
[I]t is apparent that the strategic realities which prompted
reconciliation between the United Sates and China more
than a decade ago are more pressing than ever .... Our
common resolve to coordinate our independent policies in
order to limit the Soviet Union's opportunities for exploring
its military power has, likewise, grown stronger.
239
Later, two more events made the R.O.C. government offi-
cials even more nervous. One was that in July 1981, John H.
Holdridge, U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Af-
fairs, testified before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee
on the possible sale of military weapons to China. He said,
"[T]he U.S.-China relationship is a major component in our
global and regional security policies .... We concluded that we
should revise the regulations on international traffic in arms to
permit the licensing of commercial sales to China on a case-by-
case basis." 240 The other was that China's Premier Zhao Ziyang
and Foreign Minister Huang Hua met with U.S. President Rea-
gan and U.S. Secretary Alexander Haig in Washington, D.C. in
October 1981. It was widely reported that the two sides dis-
cussed the U.S. reduction of arms sales to Taiwan and possible
sale of arms to China.
The fear of the R.O.C. government officials was not eased
by a few comforting comments by U.S. government officials that
the United States would continue its unofficial relationship with
the people of Taiwan.241 On June 16, 1981, in Beijing, Haig said
"[r] egarding Taiwan, I explained [to the Chinese officials] that
237. Sec'y Alexander Haig, Remarks at New Conference, Beijing (June 16, 1981),
in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1981, at 34-35.
238. See Sec'y Alexander Haig, Speech at St. Louis Town Hall Forum (May 29,
1981), in DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1981, at 13.
239. Sec'y Alexander Haig, Remarks at New Conference, supra note 237, at 35.
240. John H. Holdridge, U.S. Relations With China, Address before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee (July 16, 1981), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1981, at 38.
241. See id. (referencing Secretary Haig's visit to Beijing, June 14-17, 1981).
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the unofficial relationship which has characterized the contacts
between the people of the United States and the people of Tai-
wan since normalization of relations with the People's Republic
of China will be continued, and this was understood. '24 2 On Au-
gust 18, 1981, Holdridge also testified in a Congressional hear-
ing that
[t]he Chinese insisted ... that we agree to the ultimate termi-
nation of arms sales. We refused because the level of our
arms sales must be determined by the needs of Taiwan, and
we could not agree to a termination date, as the Chinese de-
manded, which might impair our ability to meet those
needs. 24
3
Either during the Chinese Premier's visit, or immediately
thereafter, the Reagan Administration agreed with the P.R.C.
government to issue another joint declaration.244 According to
one account, during the negotiations between the Reagan Ad-
ministration and the P.R.C. government for a joint declaration
in the Summer of 1982, the R.O.C. government presented the
Reagan Administration with six points that it wished the United
States would use as guidelines in conducting the U.S.-Taiwan re-
lations.245
To alleviate the fear of the R.O.C. government officials in
Taiwan, the Reagan Administration delivered a letter to them
containing a policy statement on July 14, 1982. The letter states
six things that the U.S. government "would not accede to in any
agreement with mainland China, ' 246 and came to be known as
the Six Assurances. The Six Assurances offered by the U.S. gov-
ernment to the R.O.C. government are that, in dealing with the
P.R.C. government, the United States would not: 1) set a date
242. Sec'y Alexander Haig, Remarks at New Conference, supra note 237, at 35.
243. John H. Holdridge, U.S.-China Joint Communique, Statement Before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee (Aug. 18, 1982), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1982, at 19.
244. See John H. Holdridge, Assessment of U.S. Relations With China, Address
Before the National Council on U.S.-China Relations, New York (Dec. 13, 1982), in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1983, at 8 ("I need not review in detail the 10-month long negoti-
ating or period leading up to the issuance of our August 17joint communique."). This
will put the approximate date beginning the negotiation for drafting the communiqu6
in October 1982, the month the Chinese Premier visited Reagan. See id.
245. See Taiwan Documents Project, The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan (July 1982), at
www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm.
246. Steve Lohr, Taiwan Expresses Regret Over Communique, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 18,
1982, at A13.
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for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; 2) consult with China
on arms sales to Taiwan; 3) play a mediation role between P.R.C.
and Taiwan; 4) revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5) change its
position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; or 6) exert pressure
on Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing.2 4 7
The assurance that "[t]he United States would not alter its
position about the sovereignty over Taiwan" 248 is the most cru-
cial one for the issue here because sovereignty over a territory is
based on title to the territory. This assurance meant that Reagan
had not changed the long-held U.S. position on the island of
Taiwan - that Taiwan was not China's territory.
On August 17, 1982, the U.S. government and the P.R.C.
government issued a joint communiqu6 called the Third U.S.-
China Joint Communiqu6 on Arms Sales to Taiwan ("Third
Communique"). The Third Communique reaffirmed what the
247. See Jay Chen & Deborah Kuo, U.S. Congress Congratulates Taiwanese People on
Successful Election, WORLD REP., Mar. 29. 2000, available at 2000 WL 2360456. Rep. Ben-
jamin Gilman (R-NY) praises Taiwan's courageous democracy. See id.; see also Larry M.
Wortzel, Why the Administration Should Reaffirm the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan (Mar. 16,
2000), at www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bgl352.html. There are different
versions of the Six Assurances. Wortzel describes the Six Assurances as:
the United States: [1.] Had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the
Republic of China on Taiwan; [2.] Had not agreed to hold prior consultations
with the Chinese government on arms sales to the Republic of China on Tai-
wan; [3.] Would not play any mediation role between Taiwan and China; [4.]
Had not agreed to revise the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act; [5.] Had not altered its
position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and [6.] Would not exert pressure
on the Republic of China on Taiwan to enter negotiations with the People's
Republic of China.
Wortzel, supra.
The Taiwan Documents Project lists the Six Assurances as follows:
1) The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to
Taiwan; 2) The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act; 3) The United States would not consult with China in advance
before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; 4) The United States
would not mediate between Taiwan and China; 5) The United States would
not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the ques-
tion was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would
not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; 6) The United
States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan, supra note 245.
248. The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan, supra note 245. See Implementation of the Taiwan
Relations Act: Hearing and Markup Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Sub-
comm. on Human Rights and Int'l Orgs. and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the H.R., 99th
Cong. 127-31 (1986) (statement of Martin Lasater, Dir. of Asian Studies, Heritage
Found.). See Don Oberdorfer, China Sees Diplomatic Victory in Pact; Gradual Cut for Tai-
wan Pledged, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1982, at Al.
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Shanghai Communiqu6 and the Second Communique did -
notwithstanding the P.R.C. government's claim to the island of
Taiwan, the United States simply took notice of what the P.R.C.
government claims. In the Third Communiqu6 "the United
States of America acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but
one China and Taiwan is part of China. 249
It then stated that respecting each other's sovereignty has
been the principle guiding U.S.-China relations since the Shang-
hai Communiqu6. The Third Communique conveyed that the
United States and China's
[r] espect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity
and non-interference [in] each other's internal affairs consti-
tute the fundamental principles guiding [U.S.]-China rela-
tions. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai
Communique of ... 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Com-
munique [of] ... 1973.250
In the Third Communique, the United States asserted that
it "has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and
territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs
.... 251 Yet, the U.S. government said that it would continue "its
arms sales to Taiwan," even though the sales "[would] not ex-
ceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of
those supplied in recent years .... Thus, in the eyes of the
Reagan Administration, arms sales to Taiwan did not "infring[e]
on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity .... 253
After the Third Communiqu6 was issued in August 1982,
the P.R.C. government changed the course of its foreign policy.
It began to adopt a foreign policy which stressed identification
with the Third World and even resumed a dialogue with Mos-
cow.254 The new development made the Reagan Administration
unhappy. So Reagan planned to send George Shultz, who suc-
ceeded Alexander Haig as U.S. Secretary of State, to China "for
what we hope will be serious, constructive, and wide-ranging
talks with the Chinese leadership. ' ' 255 Henry Kissinger, in com-
249. Second Communique, supra note 222.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Holdridge, Assessment of U.S. Relations With China, supra note 244, at 8.
255. Id.
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menting on the forthcoming visit of Shultz to Beijing, stated that
Schultz could not change the legal position on Taiwan, which
undoubtedly included title to the island of Taiwan. He said,
The Shultz visit cannot finally resolve the Taiwan issues. In
the Shanghai Communiqu6 of 1972, the accord on normali-
zation of 1979, and even more explicitly in the Communique
of 1982, the United States has repeatedly committed itself to
the proposition that there is only one China and that it would
not support any variety of a two-China solution. Moreover,
the United States has already recognized Peking as the gov-
ernment of all of China. In the process, both sides have had
to make painful adjustments on such issues as [U.S.] arms
sales.
The future of Taiwan must now be left to historical processes,
and for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan straits to
work out in their own subtle ways as Chinese leaders them-
selves have affirmed . . . But formal diplomacy has ex-
hausted the subject; the legal framework cannot be stretched fur-
ther.
2 5 6
U.S. President George H.W. Bush 257 succeeded Reagan in
1989. He was in office less than a year when the Tiananmen
Square incident occurred. On June 4, 1989, the P.R.C. govern-
ment sent the Chinese army into Beijing to suppress a civilian
demonstration and killed numerous students who had gathered
in the city days before.25' Bush harshly criticized the P.R.C. gov-
ernment. He said, "It is clear that the Chinese Government has
chosen to use force against Chinese citizens who were making a
peaceful statement in favor of democracy. I deeply deplore the
decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the
consequent loss of life. ' ' 25' The relationship between the U.S.
government and the P.R.C. government was at a low point. But
the Bush Administration did not announce any specific China
policy. So, officially the Administration did not change the pre-
vious U.S. position on Taiwan.
256. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Shultz Goes to China: What Should Come Out of This Trip,
IWASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1983, reprinted in HENRY KISSINGER, OBSERVATIONS: SELECTED
SPEECHES AND ESSAYS, 1982-1984 145 (1985) (second emphasis added).
257. George H.W. Bush, the U.S. President (1989-1993).
258. See Nicholas D. Kristof, China Tightens Grip with a Ban on Groups Calling for
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1989, at A10.
259. George H.W. Bush, President's Statement (June 3, 1989), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Aug. 1989, at 75.
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U.S. President WilliamJ. Clinton, 260 who succeeded Bush in
1993, was probably the most pro-P.R.C. president in postwar U.S.
history. But he did not appear to be supportive of the P.R.C.
before he became president. When he campaigned for the pres-
idency, Clinton accused President Bush of "coddling dictators,"
referring to Bush's China policy.26 1
The R.O.C. government in Taiwan scheduled a presidential
election in March of 1996. The contest was between Lee Teng-
hui, as the candidate of the ruling Nationalist Party (or Kuo
Ming Tang (KMT)), who was in favor of ultimate unification of
Taiwan and China, and Peng Ming-Min, who as the candidate of
the Democratic Progressive Party was pro-independence. To in-
timidate the voters in Taiwan, and to discourage them from vot-
ing for Peng, the P.R.C. government conducted a missile exer-
cise and shot seven or eight missiles toward the island of Taiwan.
As a show of force, Clinton sent an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan
Strait.
But Clinton changed his attitude afterwards, largely due to
the pressure of U.S. companies and trade groups. He changed
his China policy from rapprochement to cooperation. In 1997,
Clinton considered the P.R.C. government a "strategic part-
ner." '26 2 He shocked the conservatives and the R.O.C. govern-
ment officials by announcing his policy toward China in 1998.
In June of 1998, Clinton made an official trip to China. During
the visit, Clinton announced his policy before a group of Chi-
nese college students in Shanghai, later called the "Three No's
Policy." '263 The Three No's Policy is, "[n]o [U.S.] support for an
independent Taiwan, no recognition for a separate Taiwan Gov-
ernment and no support for Taiwan's entry into international
organizations. '  The Three No's Policy is Clinton's version of
the one-China policy.26 5
260. William J. Clinton, the U.S. President (1993-2001).
261. Clinton Easing Up on China, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 24, 1994, at 2A.
262. E.J. Dionne, Jr., China Policy Full of Contradictions, DENY. POST, Apr. 10, 2001,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/printrme.wbs?page=/Pagedefs/c7cld2l4d3c2ff
3a7fff2e680a141465.xml. See Patrick E. Tyler, The U.S.-China Slide: A Relationship Strained
by Trade Tension Could Worsen Further Over Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at A10.
263. See Philip Shenon, No Policy Turn, U.S. Assures Taiwan Again, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 1998, at A9; see also Herman Pan, Washington Post Editorial Finds "Noes" Fault with
Clinton, CENT. NEWS AGENCY (TAIWAN), July 2, 1998.
264. Id.
265. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, called it a one-China policy. See
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Clinton's Three No's Policy was criticized by the conserva-
tive groups in the United States as selling out Taiwan to the
P.R.C. The Clinton Administration quickly assured the leaders
of the R.O.C. government that there was no policy change.266
A careful analysis of the languages in the Three No's Policy does
not come to the conclusion that the Clinton Administration rec-
ognized China's claim to the island of Taiwan. The Three No's
Policy does not deal with title to the island of Taiwan. The first
"no" statement, "no [U.S.] support for an independent Taiwan,"
simply means that the United States will not actively support an
independence movement in Taiwan. It does not say that the is-
land of Taiwan is China's territory.
The second "no" statement, "no recognition for a separate
Taiwan Government," does not deal with title to the island ei-
ther. It means that the U.S. government will not recognize two
Chinese governments at the same time. In international law, a
State has one representative government, and only one. Since
1979, when the Carter Administration shifted recognition of
China's government from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C., the U.S. gov-
ernment no longer recognizes the R.O.C. as China's representa-
tive government.26 7 Therefore, it is not possible for the United
States, or other States that recognize the P.R.C. government, to
also recognize the R.O.C. government. Even if this statement
meant that the United States would not recognize an indepen-
dent government of Taiwan, it would still not affect the owner-
ship of the island of Taiwan.
The third "no" statement, "no support for Taiwan's entry
into international organizations," certainly has nothing to do
with territory. It is the corollary of the first and the second "no"
Jonathan S. Landay, Cohen Reiterates U.S. "One-China" Policy, Urges Beijing, Taipei to Calm
Down, KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, Mar. 17, 2000.
266. See Shenon, supra note 263, at A9.
During a meeting in Shanghai last week, Mr. Clinton appeared to make a con-
cession to his Chinese hosts by making a public declaration of a policy known
as the "three no's"-no (U.S.] support for an independent Taiwan, no recogni-
tion for a separate Taiwan Government and no support for Taiwan's entry into
international organizations.
"Nothing that the President said in China changes our relationship with Tai-
wan," said P.J. Crowley, a White House spokesman.
Id.
267. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b), 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2004)).
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statements. The first two "no" statements assume that Taiwan is
not a State. Because membership of international organizations
requires an entity to be a State, Taiwan cannot be a member of
any international organization. Thus, although the Three No's
Policy was criticized as a policy that appeased the P.R.C. govern-
ment, it does not change the United States' position on title to
the island of Taiwan.
Notwithstanding the one-China policy, the Clinton Adminis-
tration still wanted to protect Taiwan from the P.R.C.'s invasion.
The R.O.C. government in Taiwan scheduled a presidential elec-
tion in March of 2000. The contest was among three candidates
from three different political parties. Two of the candidates,
who respectively represented the Nationalist Party (KMT) and
the People First Party, a splinter of the former, were anti-inde-
pendence. The third candidate, who represented the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party, was pro-independence. To intimidate
the voters in Taiwan again and discourage them from voting for
the pro-independence candidate, the P.R.C. government issued
the 2000 White Paper.268 In the 2000 White Paper, the P.R.C. gov-
ernment threatened to use force against Taiwan if the "total uni-
fication of the country . . . [is] postponed indefinitely." 269
Although the Clinton Administration adopted the policy of
"constructive engagement" toward the P.R.C. government, 270 it
continued to maintain the U.S. position on Taiwan. In order to
assuage the P.R.C. government, U.S. Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen stressed, "We have a one-China policy that we con-
tinue to support." But when Cohen was asked if the United
States would defend Taiwan militarily if the P.R.C government
were to attack, he replied, "We also are committed under the
Taiwan Relations Act to provide defensive equipment and sup-
port [to Taiwan] ,"271 As discussed before, the Taiwan Relations
Act does not recognize the P.R.C.'s claim that the island of Tai-
wan is China's territory.272
When U.S. President George W. Bush 273 took office, he
268. See generally 2000 White Paper, supra note 53.
269. Id. at 10, 17. See Landay, supra note 265.
270. See Otto Kreisher, Defense Chief Urges "Constructive Engagement" with China Con-
tinue, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 25, 2000, at A16.
271. Id. See Landay, supra note 265.
272. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
273. George W. Bush, the U.S. President (2001-present).
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changed the U.S. attitude toward the P.R.C. government. He
called the P.R.C. government a "strategic competitor," replacing
Clinton's term "strategic partner. '274 In April 2001, not too long
after he took office, Bush pledged in a televised interview to do
"whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself. ' 275
However, he changed his attitude toward the P.R.C. govern-
ment after the September 11th event. On September 11, 2001,
when Al Qaeda groups attacked the United States with commer-
cial airplanes, the situation changed. Bush changed his strategic
attitude and approached China for assistance.
At one point, a Bush Administration official sounded a false
alarm. In May 2002, Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense, delivered a speech at the Brookings Institute on U.S.
policy toward China. In the speech, he said that the United
States "has no intention, no desire to separate Taiwan from the
mainland."27 6 The speech caught the attention of political ob-
servers because the statement "seemingly means that the U.S.
Government recognizes Taiwan is part of China. ' 277 Wolfowitz
clarified his statement a few days later. On his way to Singapore
on May 30, 2002 for a security meeting, when reporters asked
him whether his speech at Brookings Institute indicated that the
Bush Administration had changed the policy toward China, he
flatly denied it. Wolfowitz said,
That's very good caution against any improvisation. I mean
the president (George W. Bush) has been very clear. And we
have a very clear statement. I appreciate actually the opportu-
nity to say it emphatically. The president said from the begin-
ning we have a one-China policy. It basically rests on two pro-
positions. One is that we do not support Taiwan indepen-
dence, butjust as strongly and, I believe, central to the whole
notion, we oppose the use of force.278
So Bush's one-China policy rests on two propositions: the
274. See Dionne, supra note 262; see also ISSUES 2000: EVERY PRESIDENTIAL CANDI-
DATES' VIEW ON EVERY ISSUE. MORE HEADLINES: GEORGE W. BUSH ON CHINA, at http://
www.issues2000.org/Celeb/More-George _WBushChina.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2004); Kreisher, supra note 270, at A16.
275. Kelly Wallace, Bush Pledges Whatever it Takes to Defend Taiwan, at http://www.
cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
276. U.S. Against Taiwan Independence, Defence Official Wolfowitz Says, BRIT.
BROADCASTING CORP., May 31, 2002.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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United States does not support Taiwan independence, and the
United States opposes the use of force by the P.R.C. government
to take Taiwan.
The R.O.C. government in Taiwan scheduled a presidential
election in March of 2004. The contest was between President
Chen Shui-bian, the incumbent who represented the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party, and Lian Chan, who represented the
anti-independence Nationalist Party (KMT). President Chen in
December 2003 announced that the government would conduct
a referendum pursuant to the Referendum Law to coincide with
the presidential election. The P.R.C. government condemned
the proposed referendum claiming that it was a move toward
independence.
On December 9, 2003, Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao met
with U.S. President Bush in Washington. Bush, in front of Wen,
rebuked President Chen Shui-bian of the R.O.C. government for
proposing to hold the referendum. After the meeting, Bush
said, "we oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Tai-
wan to change the status quo [of Taiwan's relationship with
China]. And the comments and actions made by the leader of
Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilat-
erally that change the status quo, which we oppose. "279 It was
reported by a senior administrator after the meeting that the
U.S. President did tell the Chinese Premiere "in no uncertain
terms" that the United States "would have to get involved if
China tried to use coercion or force to unilaterally change the
status of Taiwan. 28
0
Although the language used by U.S. presidents, either to
please the P.R.C.'s leaders or to rebuke the leaders in Taiwan,
sounds unfriendly to the R.O.C. government or to Taiwan, it
does not lend color to China's claim over the island of Taiwan.
U.S. House Representative Steve Chabot said, "so long as one
China is not understood to mean that Taiwan is part of China,
then I have no problem with it at all.
281
279. Lin Chieh-yu & Charles Snyder, Chen Still Defiant After Bush Rebuke, TAIPEI
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/
archives/2003/12/11 /2003079111.
280. Id.
281. Robert E. Andrews & Steve Chabot, Two Congressmen Look at "One China", HER-
IrAGE FOUND., Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthe
pacific/h1821 .cfm.
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Based on the analysis of U.S. policy toward China, the one-
China policy advocated by U.S. Administrations is different from
the one-China principle advocated by the P.R.C. government.
The P.R.C.'s one-China principle has three propositions: there is
but one China; the P.R.C. government is the legal government
of China; and Taiwan is China's territory. The United States'
one-China policy contains only the first two propositions.
The U.S. government has not, as the P.R.C. claims, recog-
nized that the island of Taiwan is China's territory. The P.R.C.
government distorts the meaning of United States' one-China
policy, when it equates United States' one-China policy with its
own one-China principle.
C. U.N. 's Position on Taiwan
Discussion now turns to Kofi Annan's two statements relat-
ing to Taiwan mentioned at the beginning of this Article. The
first statement referred to "the Taiwan Province of China. '282
The second referred to "the organization's one-China policy. '283
As Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan is the
official representative of the organization. An examination of
the United Nations' positions toward China and Taiwan is essen-
tial, therefore, to determine if Annan's statements truly re-
present the United Nations' positions.
1. China's Representation in the United Nations
a. China as a Member of the United Nations
China's role in the United Nations is undoubtedly impor-
tant, being both a founding member of the General Assembly
and a permanent member of the Security Council. When the
United Nations was formed in September 1945, the organization
was intended to consist of States: political entities with state-
hood.2 8 4 China became a member of the United Nations and
282. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
283. Colum Lynch, U.N. Bars Taiwanese Official from Briefing, WASH. POST, May 24,
2003, at A22.
284. The U.S. government wanted to invite all States, except the Axis States, tojoin
the United Nations. The United States even invited some political entities, such as
India, which at the time had not yet gained sovereignty, but were in the process of
becoming States. SeeJOHN N. PETRIE, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM (Inst. for Nat'l Strategic Stud., McNair Paper 33, Jan. 1995).
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one of five permanent members of the Security Council.28 5
The R.O.C. government represented the member State
China in the United Nations until 1971. In 1945, when the
United Nations was formed, the government of China was the
R.O.C. with its seat in Nanjing. The R.O.C. government contin-
ued to represent China after it had lost actual control of China
proper in a civil war in April 1949. After losing the war, the
R.O.C. government took refuge on the island of Taiwan.
The Western Nations initially refused to recognize the
P.R.C. government. After the P.R.C. government was established
in October 1949, States of the Soviet bloc immediately recog-
nized the new regime as the representative government of
China. But the Western Nations refused. They regarded the
new P.R.C. regime as a satellite of the Soviet Union, which plot-
ted to create a political hegemony in the world. The invasion of
South Korea by North Korea in June 1950 was seen as a plot of
the P.R.C. regime.
Ever since the P.R.C. government was established, it has
made two claims in the United Nations. The first claim is that
the P.R.C. government, not the R.O.C. government, is the legiti-
mate government of China and is entitled to represent the State
of China in the United Nations. The second claim is that the
island of Taiwan, which has been occupied by the R.O.C. govern-
ment, is China's territory despite the fact that China has never
reacquired the island of Taiwan after the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
As to the first claim, with respect to representation in the
United Nations, the P.R.C. attempted to replace the R.O.C. as
the representative government of China for twenty-two years. In
September 1950, a year after the P.R.C. government was estab-
lished, Cuba proposed to include in the General Assembly
agenda a discussion of the question of China's representation.
The General Assembly established a Special Committee consist-
ing of seven members to consider the question. 2 6 In December
1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recom-
mending that the representation question "should be consid-
ered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter
285. See U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
286. See G.A. Res. 490, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 277th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, at
153, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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and the circumstances of each case," '287 but did not deal directly
with the question of China's representation.
During the 1951 and 1952 General Assembly sessions, no
proposal to discuss China's representation was made in the Gen-
eral Assembly. This was probably because the U.N. armed forces
were fighting the P.R.C.'s "volunteer army" in the Korean Penin-
sula,2 8 and no State would have thought it appropriate to raise
the question.
After the Korean War ended, a proposal to include the
question of China's representation in the General Assembly
agenda was made each year from 1953 through 1960 by a mem-
ber of the Soviet bloc. Each time the proposal was rejected. 289
In 1961, when a similar proposal was made again, the U.S.
government invoked an article under the U.N. Charter to create
a procedural barrier for any proposal to change the representa-
tion of China in the United Nations. The General Assembly
adopted a resolution proposed by the U.S. government to desig-
nate the representation question as an important question under
the U.N. Charter.290 Important questions require a two-thirds
287. G.A. Res. 396, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, at 98,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
288. OnJune 27, 1950, the Security Council resolved to "[r]ecommend[ I that the
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security
in the area." S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 474th mtg. at 85, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950). On
July 7, it then resolved to "[r]ecommend[ ] that all Members providing military forces
and other assistance pursuant to . . .Security Council resolutions [82 (1950) and 83
(1950)] make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under
the United States of America." S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 476th mtg. at 85-86, U.N. Doc.
S/1588 (1950).
289. See G.A. Res. 800, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., 432d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 17, at
225, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953); G.A. Res. 903, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 473d plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 21, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 990, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess.,
516th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 19, at 231, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955); G.A. Res. 1108, U.N.
GAOR, 11th Sess., 580th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 17, at 159, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1956);
G.A. Res. 1135, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., 686th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 18, at 245, U.N.
Doc. A/3805 (1957); G.A. Res. 1239, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., 755th plen. mtg., Supp.
No. 18, at 151, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res. 1351, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 803d
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 235, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); G.A. Res. 1493, U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., 895th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 184, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
290. The General Assembly "[ d] ecides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter
of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an
important question." G.A. Res. 1668, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1080th plen. mtg., Supp. No.
17, at 296, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) (second emphasis added).
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majority vote of the members present. 291
From 1962 to 1964, every year when a proposal was made in
the General Assembly to replace the R.O.C. government with the
P.R.C. government in the United Nations, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution making the question of China's representa-
tion in the United Nations an important question.29 2 But each
time the proposal did not receive the required two-thirds vote.
A crucial change in international politics took place in 1965
when France broke her diplomatic ties with the R.O.C. and ex-
tended her recognition to the P.R.C. government. France was
the first non-communist State to recognize the new government.
Soon other Western Nations began to follow. Attempts to re-
place representatives of the R.O.C. with representatives of the
P.R.C. failed in the U.N. General Assembly in 1967,293 1968,294
and 1969295 because the proposals still did not receive the two-
thirds vote.
By 1970, about half of the U.N. members recognized the
P.R.C. government as the legitimate government of China.2 9 6 In
September 1970, the U.S. government changed its policy and
was willing to allow representatives of the P.R.C. government to
take China's seat in the General Assembly and the Security
Council, if the representatives of the R.O.C. government re-
mained in the General Assembly.29 7 The P.R.C. government, on
the other hand, insisted that it would take over China's seat only
if the representatives of the R.O.C. government were expelled
291. See U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 1 2 ("Decisions of the General Assembly on impor-
tant questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and vot-
ing.").
292. For the Soviet Draft Proposal, see Adlai E. Stevenson, United Nations Rules
Out Change in Representation of China, Plen. Statement Before the General Assembly
(Dec. 1 & Dec. 14, 1961), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1962, at 117.
293. See G.A. Res. 2271, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1610th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at
241, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
294. See G.A. Res. 2389, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1724th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 18, at
116, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
295. See G.A. Res. 2500, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1808th pien. mtg., Supp. No. 30,
at 213, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
296. There were 125 members at the 1970 U.N. General Assembly plenary session.
The R.O.C. government "is recognized diplomatically by more than 60 of the members
of this organization." Christopher H. Phillips, Twenty-fifth General Assembly Rejects
Move to Change Representation of China in the U.N., Plen. Statement Before the Gen-
eral Assembly (Nov. 12, 1970), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1970, at 734.
297. See id.
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from the United Nations. 298 The U.S. government refused to ac-
cept the P.R.C.'s condition, and again proposed that the repre-
sentation question was an important question.299 The proposal was
adopted by a narrow margin this time."°° And Albania's propo-
sal to expel the representatives of the R.O.C. which followed, was
again defeated. '
b. Resolution No. 2758
The turning point for the question of China's representa-
tion was 1971. The U.S. government again suggested dual repre-
sentations of China: both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. govern-
ments were represented in the U.N. General Assembly.30 2 In Sep-
tember 1971, when the General Assembly convened, the General
Committee proposed a General Assembly agenda which in-
298. See id. at 733-34.
299. Resolution 2642 of the General Assembly, entitled "Representation of China
in the United Nations," was adopted by the 1913th plenary session of the General As-
sembly on November 20, 1970. See G.A. Res. 2642, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
28, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Recalling the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 De-
cember 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the Govern-
ment entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this
question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the ques-
tion should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and the circumstances of each case,
Recalling further its decision in resolution 1668 (XVI) of 13 December 1961, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the
representation of China is an important question, which, in General Assembly
resolutions 2025 (XX) of 17 November 1965, 2159 (XXI) of 29 November
1966, 2271 (XXII) of 28 November 1967, 2389 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968
and 2500 (XX1V) of 11 November 1969, was affirmed as remaining valid,
Affirms again that this decision remains valid. 1913th plenary meeting 20 No-
vember 1970.
Id.
300. The vote was 66 for and 52 against, with 7 abstentions. See Taiwan Documents
Project, Resolution on the Representation of China in the United Nations (Nov. 20, 1970), at
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/un2642-XXV.htm.
301. The vote was 51 for and 49 (including U.S. vote) against, with 25 abstentions.
See Phillips, supra note 296, at 735 n.2.
302. On August 2, 1971, Sec'y of State William Rogers said at a press conference,
"The United States accordingly will support action at the General Assembly this fall
calling for seating the People's Republic of China. At the same time the United States
will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China .... " William Rogers, Sec'y
Rogers Announces U.S. Policy on Chinese Representation in the U.N., Statement to
News Correspondents (Aug. 2, 1971), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1971, at 193.
303. The General Committee's function is to recommend the General Assembly
agenda.
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cluded both Albania's proposal,3 °4 calling for the representatives
of the P.R.C. government to take China's seat, as well as for the
expulsion of the representatives of the R.O.C. government from
the United Nations, and the United States' proposal calling for
"the continued right of representation of the R.O.C."3 ° 5 The
U.S. proposal to make the question of expelling the representa-
tives of the R.O.C. government an important question was not suc-
cessful this time. °6
At the end of the debates, when the proposed resolution of
Albania was put to a vote on October 25, 1971, it was adopted.30 7
Resolution No. 2758 states,
The General Assembly... decides to restore all its rights to the
People's Republic of China and to recognize the representa-
tives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives
of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they
unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organi-
zations related to it.3
0 8
304. See Resolution No. 2758, supra note 206; see also Phillips, supra note 296, at
735 n.2.
305. The Resolution is entitled, "The Representation of China in the United Na-
tions." The U.S. draft resolution, in part, reads, "The General Assembly ... 1. Hereby
affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and recommends
that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council; 2.
Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China." George H.W.
Bush, U.N. Votes to Seat People's Republic of China and Expel Representatives of Republic of
China, Plen. Statement Before the General Assembly (Oct. 18, 1971), in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Nov. 1971, at 549.
306. See id. at 556 n.3.
307. The votes were 76 for 35 against. See id.
308. Resolution No. 2758, supra note 206. Resolution No. 2758 states in full:
The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of
China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations
and for the cause that United Nations must serve under the Charter,
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Repub-
lic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations
and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council,
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recog-
nize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representa-
tives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representa-
tives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at
United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.
Id. See Phillips, supra note 296, at 735 n.2.
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The Resolution became effective immediately, and the repre-
sentatives of the R.O.C. government left the U.N. building.
From October 25, 1971 on, the P.R.C. government has rep-
resented China in the U.N. The U.S. government, however, con-
tinued to recognize the R.O.C. government as the legitimate
government of China until 1979.309 As of November 2004, only
twenty-six small States continue to recognize the R.O.C. as the
representative government of China. 1 °
2. The U.N. Position on Title to the Island of Taiwan
The second claim that the P.R.C. government made in the
United Nations is that the island of Taiwan is China's territory
and the United States has therefore violated China's territory.
Immediately after North Korea attacked South Korea, U.S. Presi-
dent Truman sent military contingents to the island of Tai-
wan. 3 11 On August 24, 1950, Chou En-Lai, the P.R.C.'s Minister
of Foreign Affairs, sent a cablegram to the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral Trygve Lie, claiming that Taiwan was part of China and the
U.S. action was an armed act of aggression on China's terri-
tory.312 In the cablegram, Chou En-Lai said,
On 27 June this year, President Truman of the United States
of America announced the decision of the United States Gov-
ernment to prevent with armed forces the liberation of Tai-
wan by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Meanwhile,
the United States Seventh Fleet move toward the strait of Tai-
wan, followed by the arrival in Taiwan of contingents of the
United States in an open encroachment on the territory of
the People's Republic of China. This action on the part of
309. See Ruan Ming, Time to Put an End to Fallacy of "One China", TAiPEI TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, available at http://taiwansecurity.org/TT/2003/TT-141103-1.htm.
310. These Nations are: Belize, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gam-
bia, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Kiribati, Malawi, the Marshall Is-
lands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, St. Christopher
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, Swaziland,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, ROC's Embassies;
Consulates and Representatives, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?ctNode=695&
CtUnit=30&BaseDSD=30 (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
311. The next day, the United Nations went to war with North Korea. The Security
Council, by a resolution, recommended that its members "furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack." S.C. Res. 83, U.N.
SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950).
312. "Taiwan is an integral part of China." Cablegram from Peiping Foreign Minis-
ter to Sec'y-Gen. Lie (Aug. 24, 1950), DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1950, at 607.
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the United States Government is a direct armed aggression
on the territory of China and a total violation of the United
Nations Charter.313
The P.R.C. government based its claim to the island of Taiwan
on historical ownership and the Cairo Declaration. Chou En-Lai
continued,
Taiwan is an integral part of China. This is not only a fact
based on history, confirmed by the situation since the surren-
der of Japan, but it is also stipulated in the Cairo Declaration
of 1943 and the Potsdam Communique of 1945 as binding
international agreements which the United States Govern-
ment has pledged itself to respect and observe. 14
The U.N. Secretary-General did not reply to Chou En-Lai's
cablegram, probably because the cablegram did not ask the
United Nations to take any action against the U.S. government.
a. The United Nations and the Treaty of San Francisco
The United Nations is bound by the territorial dispositions
of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco for four reasons. The first
reason is the United Nations' obligation under general princi-
ples of international law. As stated earlier though, in general a
third party which is not a party to a treaty is not bound by the
treaty; a third party State is bound by a territorial treaty under
the customary international law. 15 International organizations
such as the United Nations, though not parties to the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco, are also bound by the Treaty's territorial
arrangement.3 1 6
The second reason is the nature of territorial treaties. The
only way for the United Nations to express its position is by vot-
ing either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.
In international law, title to a territory cannot be decided by un-
related third party States in any way. There are only a few recog-
nized ways to acquire a territory in international law, and a vote
by unrelated third party States, even in the United Nations, is
not one of them.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See supra notes 25, 36-37 and accompanying text.
316. See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 38; see also WALLACE, supra note 11,
at 206.
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The third reason is the incapability of the United Nations to
take a position on title to a territory. The United Nations has no
power or right to take a position on title to a territory. The
United Nations is an organization formed by sovereign States to main-
tain international peace and security. It is not empowered by the U.N.
Charter or otherwise to decide the territory of States.
The fourth reason is the United Nations' obligation toward
its members. The United Nations, unlike a corporation in mu-
nicipal law, is loosely formed by sovereign States and has no will
of its own. It makes decisions only by collective actions. Its reso-
lution or position on a matter reflects the collective will or posi-
tion of its members.
The United Nations cannot take the position that the island
of Taiwan is China's territory. Any collective decision of the
United Nations on a position on title to the island of Taiwan
different from the territorial disposition of the Peace Treaty of
San Francisco would contravene the collective will of its mem-
bers who signed the Treaty in 1951. All forty-nine Allies that
signed the Treaty were U.N. members at the time when the total
members of the United Nations numbered only sixty. That
means that when the Treaty was signed, more than four-fifths of
the U.N. members were parties to the Treaty and were therefore
bound by it. To abandon the Treaty of San Francisco, an equal
proportion of the members would have to disavow the Treaty.
A brief review of the discussions in the Security Council and
the General Assembly will show that neither organization has
taken the position that the island of Taiwan is China's territory.
b. The Security Council's Position
The Security Council never took the position that the island
of Taiwan is China's territory. Almost at the same time that the
P.R.C. Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the cablegram to the U.N.
Secretary-General, the Soviet Union also accused the United
States of violating China's territory. It circulated a paper to the
members of the U.N. Security Council accusing the United
States of aggression against Formosa." 7
The U.S. government retorted that the island of Taiwan is
not China's territory and that U.S. action did not violate China's
317. See Warren R. Austin, Position on the Formosan Question, Letter to U.N.
Sec'y-Gen., Trygve Lie (Aug. 25, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1950, at 411.
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territory. U.S. Ambassador Warren Austin delivered a letter to
the U.N. Secretary-General stating, "The United States has not
encroached on the territory of China."""l "The actual status of
the island," the letter continued, "is that it is territory taken from
Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like
other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there
is international action to determine its future. 31 9
Although the U.K. government was not involved in the accu-
sations by China and Soviet Union, the United Kingdom's posi-
tion at the time was the same as that of the United States - the
island of Taiwan had not been returned to China under the
Cairo Declaration. This position was reflected in British Prime
Minister Atlee's remark in December of 1950. He said in the
House that "until China shows by her action that she is not ob-
structing fulfilment of the Cairo Declaration in respect of Korea
and accepts the basic principle of that Declaration, it will be dif-
ficult to reach a satisfactory solution of this problem [of For-
mosa] ."320
The only time the conflict between the P.R.C. government
and the R.O.C. government was ever brought before the Security
Council was in 1950. In September 1950, after the P.R.C.'s re-
peated threats to invade the island of Taiwan, the U.N. Security
Council received a complaint of the P.R.C.'s imminent armed
invasion of Taiwan. Upon receipt of the complaint, the Security
Council passed a resolution to postpone the decision, however,
without characterizing the nature of the dispute as domestic or
international. The resolution first "noted the declaration of the
People's Republic of China regarding the armed invasion of For-
mosa" and then decided "to defer consideration of [the] ques-
tion until the first meeting of the Council. ' 321 Thus, although
the Security Council did not take any position with respect to
title to the island of Taiwan, it did not treat the P.R.C.'s intended
invasion of Taiwan as a pure domestic matter.
The Security Council has no authority to deal with a pure
domestic matter of any State.322 The U.N. Charter does not em-
318. Id. at 412.
319. Id.
320. 487 PAL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1951) 2301-02.
321. S.C. Res. 87, U.N. SCOR, 506th mtg. at 87-88, U.N. Doc. S/1836 (1950) (em-
phasis added).
322. This is the case unless the Security Council is requested by a government that
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power the United Nations or the Security Council to "intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any [S]tate. ' '3 2 3 The Security Council's primary function is
"[t]o maintain international peace and security." 24
The Security Council considered the P.R.C.'s imminent in-
vasion of Taiwan an international matter. That the Security
Council did not reject the complaint as a pure domestic matter
outright proves the point. Additionally, the term "invading"
used by the Security Council in its resolution "not[ing] the dec-
laration of the People's Republic of China regarding the armed
invasion of the island of Formosa ' 325 implies that the P.R.C. was
about to send its armed forces into territory other than its
own. 3 26 In May 1951, the British Foreign Secretary Herbert Mor-
rison said, "the problem of Formosa has now become an interna-
tional problem. 327
The Security Council considered the intended invasion of
Taiwan an international matter because it did not consider the
island of Taiwan China's territory. The conflict between the
R.O.C. and the P.R.C. governments was a domestic matter. The
uprising of the Chinese Communists against the R.O.C., China's
reigning government, was a revolution. After the Communists
established the P.R.C. government, the fighting between the two
regimes was a civil war. Thus, the P.R.C.'s attempt to overthrow
the R.O.C. government by force was a domestic matter. Yet the
P.R.C.'s intended "armed invasion of the island of Taiwan" was
an international matter, not because of the P.R.C.'s intention to
crush the R.O.C. government in Taiwan by force, but because of
its announced intention to send its armed forces outside of its
own [S] tate into a foreign territory - the island of Taiwan.
is unable to keep peace within its own territory. In 1999, leaders of East Timor invited
(requested) the United Nations to send a peace keeping force to maintain the peace
and supervise the referendum. See East Timor Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at
A22; see also Stefanie Frease, Playing Hide and Seek with Int'lJustice: What Went Wrong in
Indonesia and East Timor, 10 ILSAJ. INT'L & Comp. L. 283, 285 (2004).
323. The U.N. Charter provides, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state ...." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
324. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1 (emphasis added).
325. S.C. Res. 87, U.N. SCOR, 506th mtg. at 87-88, U.N. Doc. S/1836 (1950).
326. "Invasion" defined as "the act of an army entering another country by force in
order to take control of it." OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY, at http://wwwl.
oup.co.uk/elt/oald/bin/oald2.pl (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
327. 487 PARE. DEB. H.C., (5th ser.) (1951) 2302.
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c. The General Assembly's Position
As earlier discussions on the question of China's representa-
tion show, the U.N. General Assembly never decided that the
island of Taiwan is China's territory. The debates in the U.N.
General Assembly were about the right to represent the people
in China. The question of China's representation in the United
Nations arose after the R.O.C. government moved to the island
of Taiwan. The issue before the General Assembly was who
should represent the 700 million people inhabiting China
proper in the United Nations. For twenty-two years, from Octo-
ber 1949 to October 1971, the R.O.C. government represented
the people inhabiting China, whom it did not rule, in the United
Nations.
Not once was the issue of the title to the island of Taiwan
before the General Assembly. This Article has discussed in detail
the debates on the question of China's representation from 1950
to 1971 in the United Nations for the purpose of demonstrating
that not one time did the discussion turn to whether China had
title to the island of Taiwan. When the General Assembly
adopted Resolution No. 2758, members of the General Assembly
voted on only one issue: whose representatives should sit in
China's seat.
d. Kofi Annan's Statements
The analysis above of the U.N. resolutions on China's repre-
sentation, as well as the claim made by the P.R.C. government in
the United Nations, proves that since the formation of the
United Nations neither the Security Council nor the General As-
sembly ever took the position that the island of Taiwan is China's
territory.
Kofi Annan's reference to "the Taiwan Province of China"
means that the island of Taiwan is China's territory. The refer-
ence was not supported by international law or any resolution of
the United Nations. His reference simply echoed the claim of
the P.R.C. government, and was an incorrect characterization of
Taiwan.
With respect to Annan's reference to "the organization's
one-China policy" as the reason to bar the R.O.C.'s official from
entering the U.N. headquarters to speak at the Press Club con-
ference, Annan used the term one-China policy without defining
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it. The U.N. policy which he referred to could only derive from
U.N. Resolution No. 2758 of 1971 because, after that Resolution,
no debate or any other resolution has been made either in the
General Assembly or in the Security Council concerning the
R.O.C. government or Taiwan. Without at least a formal discus-
sion, the United Nations cannot have a "policy."
So the question for Annan was that when the R.O.C. official
attempted to enter U.N. headquarters, whom did this official re-
present, the P.R.C. government or the people of Taiwan? He
could not be a representative of the P.R.C. government because
he was not an official of the P.R.C. government and, according
to the newspaper account, he did not claim to be a representa-
tive of the P.R.C. government or China.
The representative was invited by the U.N. Press Club to ex-
press the view of Taiwan which had been denied its application
for the status of an observer at the WHA. Whether the R.O.C.
official presented himself as a representative of the governing
authority of Taiwan or the people of Taiwan, the only reason
Annan refused to allow the R.O.C. official to enter was that An-
nan viewed the island of Taiwan as China's territory. That view,
as this Article points out, was incorrect and "the organization's
one-China policy" was given as an improper or fictitious reason
to bar the person.
Annan, as the chief executive of the United Nations, is
obliged not to make any statement that misrepresents the U.N.
position, especially when such statement is not supported by in-
ternational law, under which the institution was formed and op-
erates. Although his label, "the Taiwan Province of China," can-
not legitimize China's claim to the island of Taiwan, it may mis-
lead others in international politics.
D. Taiwan as a Territorial Entity
There are three implications from the conclusion that
China has not acquired title to the island of Taiwan. The first
implication is that China has no sovereignty over Taiwan. A
modern State's sovereignty is based on ownership and control of
territory. This concept is known as territorial sovereignty. Any sov-
ereignty of China over Taiwan must be based on title to the is-
land of Taiwan. And since China has not acquired title to the
island of Taiwan, it has no sovereignty over the island of Taiwan
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and its inhabitants. The one-China principle advocated by the
P.R.C. government is correct in its claims that there is only one
China and the P.R.C. is its representative government, but is
wrong in its claim that Taiwan is a part of China.
The second implication is that under international law, the
Taiwan issue is not a domestic issue for the state of China. Sell-
ing weapons to Taiwan or sending contingents to the island by
the United States does not encroach on China's sovereignty or
territory. This also means that the United Nations or other
States may rightfully intercede to prevent an invasion of the is-
land of Taiwan.
The third implication is that the island of Taiwan has an
unusual status; it may be described as a territorial entity. The
Peace Treaty of San Francisco put Taiwan in an unusual situa-
tion. As explained before, a territorial treaty, by its nature, pro-
vides final settlement of title to a territory. When the Allied Pow-
ers forced Japan to abandon title to the island of Taiwan without
making any reservations in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco,
both Japan and the Allied Powers lost the power and right to
dispose of the island. Therefore, the island is no longer owned
by any State and has not been subject to any sovereignty since
then. This is true even though the Allied Powers retained the
authority to control the island under the principle of agency by
appointing the R.O.C. government to administer Taiwan.
Taiwan is not a State.3 28 Not all civil societies are States. A
society in a territory may be a political entity, yet be neither a
State, nor subject to any sovereignty. Taiwan is not a State be-
cause it has never declared the establishment of statehood.329
Half a century after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San
Francisco, Taiwan has developed into an unusual society: a soci-
ety which is neither a State, nor subject to any sovereignty. This
Article has referred to such a territory and its society as a territo-
rial entity.
Such a situation is not unique to Taiwan. Cuba was also at
one time a territorial entity. In the Treaty of Paris between the
United States and Spain, signed after the end of the Spanish-
American War, Spain relinquished her title to Cuba.33' Even
328. For a discussion of the statehood of Taiwan, see Chiang, supra note 7.
329. For a discussion on the requirements of the modern State, see id.
330. The Treaty of Paris of 1898 between the United States and Spain after the
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though Cuba was thereafter briefly occupied by the United
States until Cuba established statehood, the territory and the so-
ciety in it were not under any sovereignty. 31 Palestine, being in
a similar situation, is also a territorial entity.332
The occupation of Cuba by the United States after the Span-
ish-American War and the occupation of the island of Taiwan by
the R.O.C. government are similar in that the occupation was
authorized in both cases. In the former, the occupation was au-
thorized by a treaty, while in the latter, the occupation was au-
thorized by the United States as the victorious State that de-
feated Japan. Although the Peace Treaty of San Francisco con-
tains no provision with respect to the post-treaty administration
of the affairs of Taiwan, it is presumed that the R.O.C. govern-
ment, which was authorized by the United States as its agent to
conduct a military occupation of the island of Taiwan, is to con-
tinue the administration of the island. This is true because there
has never been a directive by the United States or the Allied
Powers changing the mandate of the R.O.C. government. While
the United States withdrew from Cuba soon after Cuba estab-
lished statehood, the R.O.C. government has since administered
the affairs of Taiwan for more than fifty years.
With respect to the island of Taiwan, the term "Allied Pow-
ers" or "Allies" in this Article essentially refers to the United
States. To clarify, in describing the Second World War and the
end of the Spanish-American War provides, "Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty
over and title to Cuba." Treaty of Paris, supra note 36, at 1754.
331. Article I provides:
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the
island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States,
the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and dis-
charge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of
its occupation, for the protection of life and property.
Treaty of Paris, supra note 36, at 1754.
332. Palestine, which is not a State, is under the administration of the Palestine
Administration. The territory of Palestine is not owned by any State, but the lands
where Palestinians reside are people's property owned by the society of Palestinians. See
James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT'L
LAw 307 (1990). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J.
INr'L LAw 301 (1990). East Timor was once in a similar situation. Its inhabitants voted
for independence in the August 1999 referendum and is not under any sovereignty.
Pending a preparation for establishing statehood under the U.N. administration, the
territory belongs to the people and is owned by the people of East Timor collectively.
See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Issues in a Newly Independent East Timor, DEP'T OF THE PARL.
LIBRARY (Austl.), Research Paper 21 (2001).
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Peace Treaty of San Francisco, this Article has referred to the
victorious States over Japan as Allied Powers or Allies. But it is
clear that it was the United States that fought with and defeated
Japan. 3  It was to the United States that Japan surrendered.3 4
It was the United States that, as the victorious State, won the
right to dispose of Japan's territory as it wished. 35 It was the
United States that assigned Chiang Kai-shek's R.O.C. govern-
ment to occupy and administer the island of Taiwan on its be-
half.33 6 So, fifty years later, the R.O.C. government still acts as an
agent of the United States. The passage of time will not change,
and has not changed, the legal relationship of agent and princi-
pal.
IV. A SOLUTION FOR THE TAIWAN PROBLEM
The U.S. one-China policy is against the interests of the peo-
ple of Taiwan because it is ambiguous. Although the U.S. posi-
tion is that the island of Taiwan is not China's territory, each
Administration has interpreted and acted upon the policy differ-
ently. In recent years, Clinton Administration and Bush Admin-
istration officials even announced "no Taiwan independence" or
"no support for Taiwan independence. 33 7 Such policy state-
ments have created a misunderstanding of U.S. policy toward
Taiwan, by mistakenly being interpreted as the U.S. government
acquiescing to or recognizing China's claim over Taiwan.338
The one-China policy is against the interests of the people
of Taiwan because it does not solve nor offer to solve the prob-
333. See MACARTHUR, supra note 58, at 291 and accompanying text.
334. See KERR, supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Incoming Message,
WARX 48672, supra note 95.
335. See Dulles, The San Francisco Conference on Proposed Japanese Peace
Treaty, supra note 31.
336. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text; see also Incoming Message,
WARX 48672, supra note 95.
337. See Darryl N. Johnson, U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Building on Success, Address
Before the American Institute in Taiwan, Twenty-Second AnnualJoint Business Confer-
ence (Nov. 10, 1998), available at http://ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/viewer.asp?ID
=1998111701&GROUP=BG; see also Charles Snyder, U.S.' Taiwan Policy in Doubt: Aca-
demic, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 4. 2003, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/
archives/2003/12/04/2003078256.
338. See China Says It Will Not Use Nuclear Weapons Against Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
3, 1999, at A3 ("The threats have been met by concern from the United States, which
recognizes Beijing's claim to the island but is bound by [U.S.] law to aid Taiwan's de-
fense.").
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lem of Taiwan. The policy has solved China's representation
problem in the United Nations, but it does not provide any relief
to Taiwan because the island of Taiwan is not part of China. It is
time that the U.S. government develops a Taiwan policy - one
that provides a permanent solution to the Taiwan problem.
Some solutions have been suggested by the Allies in the
past. At one time, they suggested that the Taiwan problem be
solved by the United Nations. U.S. President Harry S. Tru-
man3 3 9 suggested that the Taiwan problem should be considered
by the United Nations. In June 1950, President Truman stated
in his Statement on Korea that "[t]he determination of the future
status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the
United Nations. 34 ° In August 1950, Truman instructed the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren Austin, to deliver a
letter to the U.N. Secretary-General recommending the United
Nations to consider the question of Formosa. The letter said,
"The United States would welcome United Nations considera-
tion of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Na-
tions investigation here or on the spot.' We believe that United
Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather
than a forceable [sic] solution of that problem. '3 4 1 On Septem-
ber 21, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Acheson, in requesting the
"question of Formosa" to be included on the U.N. General As-
sembly agenda for consideration, said, "The United States be-
lieves ... that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million
people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "342 In May
1951, before the signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco,
U.S. President Truman, facing the possible invasion of Formosa
by the Communist Chinese army, took the position of shielding
Formosa with the U.S. Seventh Fleet until its status could be set-
339. Harry S. Truman, the U.S. President (1945-1953).
340. Truman, Statement on Korea, supra note 83.
341. Austin, supra note 317, at 412.
342. Discussion of the item was, at the proposal of the United Kingdom, ad-
journed sine die. See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, to
the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (July 13, 1971), available at http:/
/www.heritage.org/Press/Events/loader.cfm?url=/Commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&
PagelD=56573; see alsoJ.P. Jain, The Legal Status of Formosa: A Study of British, Chinese and
Indian Views, 57 AM.J. INT'L L. 25, 30 n.19 (1963).
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tled through consideration by the United Nations. 343
The United Kingdom also, at one time, wanted to refer the
Taiwan problem to the United Nations for solution. In Novem-
ber of 1950, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Davies in the Attlee
Administration stated in the House of Commons, "The main aim
of His Majesty's Government is to help in securing a generally
acceptable and peaceful solution of the Formosan problem ....
Naturally we shall take advantage of any opportunity which may
arise within the United Nations to bring about a solution." '3 4 4
In May of 1951, the Attlee Administration again expressed
the desire to refer the Taiwan problem to the United Nations.
During the Korean War, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Mor-
rison said in the British House of Commons, "In the view of His
Majesty's Government, [the problem of Formosa] is a question
which could usefully be considered by the United Nations at the
appropriate time. ' 45
Similarly, the Conservative Party, which succeeded the La-
bor Party, expressed the same view in 1952. The House mem-
bers agreed with British Foreign Secretary Major Beamish in the
Churchill Administration that "the future of Formosa should be
settled by the United Nations and not by force of arms." '346
Winston Churchill, who changed his position after making
the Cairo Declaration, also supported a solution of the Formosa
problem by the United Nations. In 1954, after being reap-
pointed as British Prime Minister for the second time, Churchill
said in the British House of Commons, "Nor do I see any reason
why at some subsequent date Formosa should not be ... placed
in the custody of the United Nations." '47
After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco,
the Allies suggested the creation of the State of Formosa to solve
the Taiwan problem. In 1955, the government of the United
Kingdom made the suggestion. 48 It further suggested that both
China and the new State of Formosa be included in the United
343. See Gen. MacArthur's Statement, supra note 72, at A7.
344. 478 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) 174.
345. 487 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1951) 2302.
346. 496 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1952) 1027.
347. 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) 494.
348. In January 1955, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggested the estab-
lishment of the State of Formosa. See Drew Middleton, Britain's Formosa Solution Is Two
Chinas, Both in U.N., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1955, at Al.
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Nations.349 The New York Times reported, "It is said on good au-
thority that the [British] Government would not be doing this
without some sign from President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles that they, too, consider that this is the only long-
term solution now apparent. '"350
Although the island of Taiwan is no longer owned by any
State, the island has become the people's property, a concept de-
rived from the Roman law concept of res humani iuris or "things
subject to human dominion."3 5' People's property is property
owned by a society or, more specifically, the people of the society
as a whole.
It has been half a century since the conclusion of the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco. It is now too late for the United Nations
or for the Allied Powers, including the United Kingdom or the
United States, to decide the future of Taiwan. It is time that the
political future of Taiwan, like East Timor, be decided by its in-
habitants. 5 2
The idea that the future of Taiwan should be determined by
its inhabitants has been supported in the past. In 1951, to the
question of whether the wishes of the people of Formosa would
be taken into account in determining its future, British Foreign
Secretary Morrison in the Atlee Administration replied, "I think
it is clearly desirable that the wishes of the inhabitants of For-
mosa should be taken into account. '3 53 The British Conservative
Party, which succeeded the Labor Party, also expressed the same
view. British Foreign Secretary Major Beamish of the Churchill
Administration, in reminding members of the House not to
overlook the views of the Formosans themselves, said, "Article 73
of the United Nations Charter ... lays it down clearly that terri-
tories detached from enemy States come under the trusteeship
section where . . . 'the principle is laid down that the interests of
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount.' "54
349. See id.
350. Id. at 2.
351. Gaius in Book II, Section 2 states, "The first division of things is into two
classes: things subject to divine dominion, and things subject to human dominion."
GAius, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAw 157, 158 (Edward Poste trans., 2nd ed. 1994). Section
10 states, "Things subject to human dominion [res humani iuris] are either public or
private." Id.
352. See Frease, supra note 323, at 285.
353. 487 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1951) 2302.
354. 496 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1952) 1027.
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The position of the United States was once the same, albeit
not explicit. In answering the questions of the Soviet govern-
ment on the Peace Treaty with Japan, the U.S. government
stated that the
Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore "Man-
churia, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of
China." That Declaration, like other wartime declarations
such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was . . .subject to any
final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be
considered. The United States cannot accept the view, appar-
ently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of
other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored.
Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that
issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the
United Nations Charter, the obligation of which prevail over any
other international agreement.3 55
The statement undoubtedly refers to Article I of the U.N. Char-
ter which describes as one of its purposes: "To develop friendly
relations among [N] ations based on the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples."3 56
The doctrine of self-determination has been a heated issue
during the twentieth century, especially after World War 11.1
5 7
The doctrine can be traced to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century ideology of nationalism 5 ' and has been strengthened by
the twentieth century's concept of human rights. In its historical
context, the doctrine of self-determination means determination
by a group of people with the same social, ethnic, and cultural
background inhabiting one area, or living in a territory within a
355. Answer to Soviet Questions on Principles for Japanese Treaty, Aide-M~moire
Delivered toJ.A. Malik, Soviet Rep. to the U.N. (Dec. 27, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,Jan.
1951, at 65-66 (emphasis added).
356. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2 (emphasis added).
357. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERIMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL
44-47 (1995). Antonio Cassese states:
[S]elf-determination is a powerful expression of the underlying tensions and
contradictions of international legal theory: it perfectly reflects the cyclical os-
cillation between positivism and natural law, between an emphasis on consent,
that is, voluntarism, and an emphasis on binding "objective" legal principles,
between a "statist" and a communitarian vision of world order.
Id. at 1.
358. See HANNUM, supra note 9, at 27; see also Otto Hintze, The Emergence of the
Democratic Nation-State, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 69 (Heinz Lubasz
ed., 1964).
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State, of their own political future, including establishing a State
of their own by a referendum or other methods.35: 9
An issue in international law is whether a minority group
within a State has the right of self-determination against the
wishes of the sovereign State. If self-determination is recognized
as a right in international law, then it sets a limitation on the
sovereign power of the governing State. 360 The international
community for the most part supports the principle of self-deter-
mination.61 International conventions concluded after World
War II also embrace this principle.362 In practice, most of the
new Nations which were established after World War II were cre-
ated out of European and U.S. colonies in the name of self-de-
termination.
While the people of Taiwan may choose to hold a referen-
dum - the procedure frequently used in self-determination -
to decide their own political future, they do not have to rely on
the doctrine of self-determination. They do not face the prob-
lem that most minority groups seeking self-determination face
- challenging the sovereignty of a controlling State, i.e., break-
ing free from a ruling Nation. The people of Taiwan would not
be challenging the sovereign power of any State, including
China, should it decide to establish a State by a referendum or
other means because it is not under the sovereignty of any State.
Although Taiwan has held general elections, a general elec-
tion, including the election of the president, does not necessarily
reflect the common wish of the people regarding their political
359. See HANNUM, supra note 9, at 36.
360. Although some States are not as ready to recognize such a right for minority
groups of people who reside in their main territories, e.g., Russia for Chechens, Turkey
for Kurds. See Anatol Lieven, Letters-Review, NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 2000 (reviewing
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Living with Russia (Fall 2000)), available at http://www.findarticles.
com/p/articles/mi m2751/is_2000_Winter/ai_68547483/print (last visited Nov. 18,
2004).
361. See William R. Cumming, Self-Determination and National Security Concerns, at
http://faculty.lls.edu/-manheimk/ns/cumming.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
362. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1; see also Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see also Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3. Article 1 of the two Covenants provides, "All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Int'l Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra; Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra.
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future, i.e., whether they wish to establish statehood. In a gen-
eral election, voters, in casting their votes, choose a candidate or
candidates based on various issues, including the character of
the candidate. A referendum, on the other hand, is a procedure
by which the people express their common wish by voting on
one issue. Therefore, the only way for the people of Taiwan to
express freely and clearly their common wish regarding their po-
litical future is by a referendum on that single issue.
Since the P.R.C. government was established in 1949, it has
claimed sovereignty over Taiwan for the last fifty years and has
threatened to use force to "reunite" Taiwan with China. During
Taiwan's presidential election in 1996, the P.R.C. government
intimidated the voters in Taiwan with threats of the use of force
if they did not vote for the candidate of its choice. In 2000, the
P.R.C. government, in its 2000 Wite Paper, again threatened to
use force against Taiwan if the R.O.C. government further
delayed the "reunification" talks. Under such circumstances, the
people of Taiwan could not express their will freely in a referen-
dum.
The Unites States has contributed to the predicament of the
people of Taiwan. It forced Japan to abandon the island of Tai-
wan in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, but permitted the
R.O.C. government to continue its occupation of the island, leav-
ing the political status of Taiwan unsettled. Recent public state-
ments of U.S. officials that the U.S. government does not sup-
port Taiwan independence, and that the U.S. government op-
poses a referendum in Taiwan, do not help to solve the Taiwan
problem. These statements are not consistent with the U.S. posi-
tion on title to the island of Taiwan after the Second World War.
The United States, as the leading power of the one-time Allied
Powers, has a moral obligation today to support a referendum in
Taiwan for the people to determine their political future.
The United Nations can also play a small but important role
in the Taiwan problem.363 While the United Nations cannot de-
cide the fate of Taiwan, the United Nations should administer a
referendum in Taiwan on a single question, i.e., the political fu-
ture of Taiwan. There are such precedents. East Timor was one
363. See Charles Hill, Why East Timor Matters, Hoover Digest (2000), available at
http://www.hooverdigest.org/001/hi112.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
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of them.36 4 In order to assure that the people of Taiwan may
express their will freely without fear of military threats by the
P.R.C. government, the United States and the rest of the world
should guarantee that the result of the referendum will be
respected and protected by all States. Such a solution to the Tai-
wan problem is consistent with the U.N. Charter and Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
365
CONCLUSION
This Article, by applying the principles of international law,
analyzed the Cairo Declaration, the occupation of the R.O.C.
government, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, and other his-
torical events with respect to the rules of international law and
concluded that China has not reacquired title to the island of
Taiwan after the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Thus, China has no sov-
ereignty over the island of Taiwan and its people. The one-
China principle that the P.R.C. government advocates is flawed
in its proposition that Taiwan is part of China. The one-China
policy that has formed U.S. foreign policy toward China for the
last three decades is not the same as the one-China principle
held by the P.R.C. government; it is at best vague, and at times
misleading.
This Article has offered a solution for the Taiwan problem
- a referendum by the people of Taiwan to be conducted by the
United Nations with an international guarantee of its result.
364. See Frease, supra note 322, at 284-85; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 332, at 3-4.
365. See supra note 362.
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